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Chapter 1
Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty relies on subjective assessments of probabilities and
outcomes of possible states of the world. How individuals form these assessments has
been subject to a controversial dispute among economists. A popular hypothesis is
that individuals use all relevant information when forming their assessments or expec-
tations and learn from past errors. According to this rational expectations hypothesis
expectations may turn out to be individually wrong, but are correct on average. Thus,
expectations are assumed to equal their true statistical expected value which rules
out the possibility of systematic expectation errors (see the seminal paper on rational
expectations by Muth, 1961).
The rational expectation hypothesis is part of the overall concept of the Homo
Economicus which has provided the basic behavioral assumption in many standard
economic theories. The unemotional and self-interested Homo Economicus acts ratio-
nally to obtain the highest possible well-being given his preferences and information
about his opportunities. Homo Economicus is rational in the sense that, based on his
unbiased judgments, he follows the economic principle of choosing actions in order to
attain his subjectively defined goals to the greatest possible extent given his available
resources. One implication of the standard economic approach is that, at least on av-
erage, individuals are able to identify and choose what is best for them. In the context
of decision making under uncertainty, Homo Economicus always acts in accordance
with several rationality requirements, like the independence axiom of expected util-
ity theory or consistency with first-order stochastic dominance (see e.g. Mill, 1836,
Kirchgässner, 1991, and Persky, 1995, for characteristics and the origin of Homo
Economicus).
In contrast, behavioral economics acknowledges that in reality humans sometimes
systematically fail to identify the optimum or to choose what they have identified as
the optimum. Behavioral economics integrates insights from psychology and sociology
into economic thinking and tries to formalize ways in which behavior differs from the
predictions of standard theories. Essentially, three bounds of human nature in judg-
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ment and choice have so far been established: bounded rationality, bounded willpower
and bounded self-interest. Bounded rationality refers to the fact that human infor-
mation processing or cognitive abilities are limited which, in contrast to the rational
approach, allows for systematic errors in expectation formation. Bounded willpower
or incomplete self-control means that people sometimes act in conflict with their own
long-term interest. Finally, bounded self-interest captures the fact that preferences
may have a social dimension which leads people to sacrifice their own interests for
the benefit of others (see e.g. Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000, Camerer et al.,
2003, Diamond and Vartiainen, 2007, or DellaVigna, 2009, for overviews of the
behavioral economics approach).
Given this general background, this thesis deals with standard and behavioral per-
spectives on the role of expectations in individual decision making. Chapter 2 consid-
ers the influence of subjective expectations on insurance demand. The analysis takes
a standard approach by arguing that the subjective risk assessment of the insurant
contains elements of private information which makes it superior to the objective risk
assessment made by the insurer. Exploiting private information in decision making is
fully consistent with the rationality criterion. In contrast, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 take a be-
havioral approach to decisions under uncertainty and subjective assessments. Chapter
3 experimentally investigates whether risk preferences deviate from the assumptions of
expected utility theory and the basic rationality requirement of consistency with first-
order stochastic dominance. Chapters 4 and 5 consider the behavioral implications of
deviations of subjective from objective assessments which are caused by a systematic
bias instead of a private information advantage. Contradicting the rationality postu-
late and ruled out within the standard framework, the occurrence of systematic errors
in subjective belief formation prevents individuals from efficient decision-making.
More precisely, Chapter 2 empirically examines determinants of the individual de-
cision to take up a private pension insurance policy. Standard economic theory offers
a strong theoretical foundation for welfare-enhancement of annuities. Conflicting with
this theoretical prediction, the actual take up of annuities is remarkably low. This
phenomenon is known as the annuity puzzle. There are several competing explana-
tions for the annuity puzzle within a standard framework. Most prominent is the
hypothesis that the annuity market is characterized by adverse selection which implies
prohibitively high insurance premiums for low-risk individuals. Selection into insur-
ance schemes may take place either actively or passively. Here, active selection refers
to the use of private information about expected longevity when deciding about the
insurance purchase. Passive selection means that annuitants tend to have higher in-
come and wealth than non-annuitants, factors which are also correlated with mortality.
Active and passive risk selection may contribute to mortality rates of annuitants which
are substantially below that of the general population and thus result in relatively high
insurance premia. Possibly, the inability of insurance companies to hedge aggregate
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mortality risk in the population adds to the price mark-up (see e.g. Blake et al.,
2002, Brown and Orszag, 2006). Alternative rational explanations for limited annu-
ity demand include pre-existing annuitization, risk-sharing in couples or the existence
of bequest motives (Brown, 2007).
The analysis in Chapter 2 contributes to an assessment of the validity of adverse
selection as a rational explanation for the annuity puzzle. For that purpose, the de-
terminants of private pension insurance uptake of German households are empirically
investigated. While the analysis takes into account some insights from behavioral eco-
nomics, a special emphasis is put on the role of subjective life expectancy for the
decision to take up pension insurance. In fact, subjective life expectancy is found
to be positively related with the probability of having supplementary private pension
insurance. Consistent with standard theories of insurance demand, the analysis thus
provides micro level evidence for active risk selection into insurance schemes. The
empirical result suggests that the German private pension insurance market is actu-
ally characterized by adverse selection. However, as will be shown later, the effect is
quantitatively small which calls for additional (behavioral) explanations of the present
phenomenon.
Chapter 3 studies choice under risk of small-holder farmers in a developing coun-
try. In monetarily incentivized experiments, consistency of choices under risk with the
predictions of expected utility theory and the criterion of first-order stochastic dom-
inance is tested. Expected utility theory is the dominant theory of decision making
under risk in economics. It defines rational decision making based on a set of axioms
-completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence- which thus provide criteria
for testing rationality of choice. Most controversial is the independence axiom, while
the axioms of completeness, transitivity and continuity are rather uniformely accepted.
The independence axiom states that for any three lotteries p, q and r, p  q implies
λp + (1 − λ)r  λp + (1 − λ)r for all λ from the interval (0, 1), where p  q means
that p is preferred to q. Consistency of choices with the independence axiom is tested
by offering two pairs of lotteries where the second set of lotteries is derived from the
first as stated in the axiom. This experimental design is known as the common ratio
problem and has been introduced by Allais, 1953. First-order stochastic dominance
is a rational principle of decision making that posits that stochastically dominating
gambles are preferred over stochastically dominated gambles. A gamble A first-order
stochastically dominates a gamble B if for any monetary outcome x, A gives an at
least as high probability of receiving at least x as B does, and for some x, A gives a
higher probability of receiving at least x. Consistency with the criterion of first-order
stochastic dominance is tested by offering a pair of lotteries where one lottery first-order
stochastically dominates the other. The results suggest that systematic violations of
the independence axiom and stochastic dominance occur not only in samples from the
developed world, but also from the developing world. An analysis of the determinants
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of violating the independence axiom and stochastic dominance using complementary
survey data indicates that psychogical traits of the decision maker tend to be more
relevant than sociodemographic characteristics.
Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis then proceed with a behavioral analysis of the role of
systematic errors in beliefs for individual decision making. The type of bias under con-
sideration is overconfidence as according to DeBondt and Thaler, 1995, “perhaps
the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfi-
dent”. Overconfidence generally refers to upward biased beliefs of individuals about
their abilities and personal attributes and represents one example of bounded rational-
ity (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). It has been identified as one of the most
important systematic violations of theories of rational belief formation (Hvide, 2002,
DellaVigna, 2009). The literature distinguishes three types of overconfidence. The
first type of overconfidence is given by unrealistic positive self-evaluations and refers
to the tendency of overestimating one’s own positive attributes in absolute terms or
relative to others (Greenwald, 1980). The second concept of overconfidence is a
systematic overestimation of the precision of one’s knowledge which implies an under-
estimation of the variance of random variables. This type of overconfidence is often
referred to as miscalibration (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). A third stream of literature
regards overconfidence as illusion of control (Langer, 1975) and unrealistic optimism
which means that people overestimate personal success probabilities. Numerous studies
provide evidence for the presence of overconfidence of all types in different samples.
My dissertation considers the behavioral implications of overconfidence in two differ-
ent decision situations. First, the impact of unrealistic positive self-evaluations during
preparation for a future task on performance and subjective well-being of the decision
maker is assessed. Second, the role of unrealistic positive self-evaluations and unre-
alistic optimism for risk taking in an income generation process are evaluated. Both
studies in Chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis provide theoretical and empirical evidence for
welfare-reducing effects of overconfidence.
Chapter 4 studies the implications of overconfidence during preparation for a fu-
ture task. It is argued that overconfidence is associated with twofold costs as it lowers
objective performance and subjective well-being. The study shows theoretically and
empirically that overly optimistic beliefs about one’s own existing knowledge are detri-
mental for future objective task performance and subjective well-being. A utility-based
model is used to demonstrate that the erroneous feeling of mastering a task induces
an underestimation of the marginal productivity of subsequent effort. Therefore, over-
confidence leads to less than optimal effort spending and inefficiently low performance.
The loss of subjective well-being is a consequence of the inefficiently low performance
combined with an expectation-inflating effect of overconfidence. The theoretical pre-
dictions are confirmed in an empirical application of the model to the learning process
of university students who spend study effort to accumulate knowledge.
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Chapter 5 examines the impact of overconfidence on risk taking in the income gen-
eration process. It is argued that an unrealistic positive view of the own abilities leads
to overly high expected returns from pursuing an income generating activity. Conse-
quently, the willingness to take risk associated with an activity raises. In a sample of
poor small-holder farmers from Ethiopia, the study empirically shows that farmers who
overestimate their ability to generate crop yields cultivate riskier crops. Consequently,
overconfident farmers experience larger income fluctuations. Overconfidence causes a
welfare loss to the decision-maker and his dependents due to the absence of efficient
insurance tools and the dependence on costly informal coping mechanisms in case of
income losses. Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Subjective Life Expectancy and
Pension Insurance Demand1
2.1 Introduction
The German welfare state comprises a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system
designed to prevent old-age poverty and to maintain the standard of living after with-
drawal from working life. In contrast to funded systems, a PAYG plan is directly
financed from current contributions and therefore requires a nearly permanent balance
of contributions and payments. Population aging and negative incentive effects have
increasingly threatened the German system and triggered a reform process to keep
its financing sustainable. This has been accompanied by a lively discussion of the
system’s opportunities and limitations, that has created awareness of falling replace-
ment rates from the public statutory system and the need for supplementary private
old-age provision. In addition to pure accumulation of financial and non-financial as-
sets, investment in private pension insurance policies presents one possible way to raise
retirement income and concomitantly insures against outliving one’s wealth. Conse-
quences of shifting substantial parts of old-age provision from the public to the private
sector, however, depend on the efficiency of this market.
A main concern over insurance markets raised by theoretical research, is the pres-
ence of information asymmetries between insurers and the insured that lead to market
failure due to moral hazard and adverse selection. As pension insurance covers the
financial risk related to longevity, moral hazard would be present if pension insurance
coverage induced life-prolonging behavior that cannot be observed by the insurer. Ad-
verse selection would be present if the length of life could be more accurately predicted
by the insurant himself than by the insurer, and people expecting relatively long life
1This chapter is a slightly modified version of the article “Betting on a Long Life - the Role of
Subjective Life Expectancy in the Demand for Private Pension Insurance of German Households”
jointly written with Katharina Schulte and published in the Journal of Applied Social Science Studies
(Schmollers Jahrbuch), 132 (2012), 233–263.
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systematically purchased larger pension insurance coverage. Concerning moral hazard,
most people agree that in developed countries like Germany individual life-prolonging
activities can be seen as independent of pension insurance coverage. Moral hazard
is therefore reasonably assumed to be quantitatively negligible, if not non-existent.2
In contrast, adverse selection in pension insurance markets is a concern. As a conse-
quence of adverse selection, premiums rise and eventually become prohibitively high
for low-risk individuals who are pushed out of the market.
In an attempt to explain the observed low uptake of annuities -the annuity puzzle-
related studies consistently provide evidence for adverse selection in the UK and the US
annuities market (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004, for the UK and Friedman
and Warshawsky, 1990, Mitchell et al., 1999, Brown, 2001, and Brown et
al., 2008a, for the US). First empirical evidence by Gaudecker and Weber, 2004,
suggests that the German private pension market is also characterized by adverse
selection. If this was the case, it might be too expensive for individuals who expect to
die early to compensate public pension shortfalls by private pension insurance.
Our work contributes to the literature on adverse selection in annuity markets. In
contrast to most related studies that take the Money’s Worth approach introduced by
Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988, we investigate the existence of adverse selection
on the micro level. Our main interest is the explanatory power of subjective life ex-
pectancy in the uptake of private pension insurance. According to previous research,
subjective life expectancy is a remarkably good predictor of actual lifetime. In par-
ticular, it is superior to predictions based on mortality tables as made by the insurers
(Hamermesh, 1985, Hurd and McGarry, 1995, 2002). Expectations about lifetime
therefore represent private information and give a risk selection opportunity to the
insurants as return on investment of a pension insurance policy increases with lifetime.
In the same vein, a study on formation and updating of subjective life expectancy
by Steffen, 2009, finds correlations of subjective life expectancy with private infor-
mation like individual health behavior and health status as well as rational updating
of expectations after e. g. adverse health shocks. Based on these findings, our work
now seeks to answer the question whether people actually make use of their private
information about lifetime when deciding about old-age provision. If, conditional on
other relevant determinants, subjective life expectancy was positively associated with
the probability of having supplementary private pension insurance, this would indicate
adverse selection in this market.
We will test this hypothesis using the German SAVE survey data on savings and
old-age provision. Guided by the theory of savings and the life cycle with uncertain time
of death beginning with Yaari, 1965, and previous empirical studies, we provide an in-
2This view is shared in large parts of the literature; see among others Finkelstein and Poterba,
2004, and Rothschild, 2009. See, however, Philipson and Becker, 1998, for a discussion of the
existence of moral hazard effects in the market for annuities.
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depth analysis of the determinants of pension insurance uptake of German households
with a special focus on the role of subjective life expectancy. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the related theoretical
and empirical literature. The German Old-Age Pension System is presented in Section
2.3. Section 2.4 describes the data and methodology in use and contains estimation
results. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Related literature
Within an overall assessment of the determinants of pension insurance uptake, we
specifically focus on the role of subjective life expectancy to understand whether the
German private pension market is characterized by adverse selection. Our work thus
mainly relates to two broad strands in the literature. First, we refer to the theoretical
and empirical literature on life cycle savings and annuity demand dealing with optimal
annuitization in portfolio choice and practically relevant determinants of the annuiti-
zation decision. Second, we refer to the theoretical and empirical discussion of adverse
selection in insurance markets in general and in annuity markets in particular.
Yaari, 1965, was the first who incorporated uncertain lifetimes in the classical life
cycle savings theory of Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954. His model is a theoretical
conjunction of mortality expectations and time and risk preference parameters in de-
termining optimal annuitization. The main implication of his theory of consumption
under the presence of longevity risk is that risk averse utility maximizing consumers
who face actuarially fair insurance prices should fully annuitize their wealth, provided
that they do not have any bequest motive. Davidoff et al., 2005, later confirmed the
complete annuitization result within a more general framework.
Compared to the theoretical predictions of full or at least high annuitization, ob-
served uptake of annuities is surprisingly low (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990,
Brown and Poterba, 2000, James and Song, 2001, and James and Vittas, 2000).
This gap between theory and reality has caused a large body of literature dedicated
to resolve this so called annuity puzzle. Among potential explanations for the puzzle
are adverse selection, administrative load factors, bequest motives, risk-sharing within
families, pre-existing annuities from social security, financial illiteracy and precaution-
ary savings for the event of unexpected expenditure shocks. In this context, Brown,
2001, empirically investigates the behavioral relevance of Yaari’s life cycle model by
relating a utility measure of annuity value to actual household decisions. Following
the life cycle model, he calculates the utility measure - the annuity equivalent wealth -
based on cohort mortality tables and survey data on risk aversion, marital status, and
the presence of pre-existing annuity flows from social security. Brown, 2001, finds
that households for which the life cycle model predicts to have a higher valuation of
annuities are in fact more likely to annuitize their retirement resources. However, in
accordance with the annuity puzzle, much of the variation in the actual decision re-
mains unexplained by the life cycle model. He therefore considers several additional
factors that might influence the annuitization decision where he identifies individual
health status and time horizon for financial decision-making to be the most relevant.
Related to our research purpose, the importance of individual health status in ex-
plaining the actual annuitization decision conditional on average mortality from life
tables is particularly interesting. It points to the fact that people use private informa-
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tion on health status and expected longevity in the old-age provision decision which
would be consistent with the presence of adverse selection in annuity markets. A gen-
eral theoretical framework of adverse selection was introduced by Akerlof, 1970,
which Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, later applied to the insurance market. The
basic idea is that private information about individual risk gives insurants an informa-
tion advantage over the insurer which allows higher-risk individuals to self-select into
insurance contracts. Pooled risks are then comparatively high, insurance premiums
rise and crowd lower-risk individuals out of the market. Thus, the theory of adverse
selection predicts a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk.
A wide body of literature studies the empirical importance of adverse selection in
insurance markets. Two markets that have been frequently studied are the automobile
and the health insurance market. For the automobile insurance market, the early
studies of Dahlby, 1983, and Puelz and Snow, 1994, suggest a positive coverage-risk
correlation, which, however, was not reinforced by subsequent research (Chiappori
and Salanié, 2000, and Dionne et al., 2001). Conflicting findings are also available
for the health insurance market. While Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998, support the
theoretical prediction of positive correlation, Cardon and Hendel, 2001, and Fang
et al., 2008, reject it. Available studies on the market for life insurance (Cawley and
Philipson, 1999, and McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010) so far consistently suggest
absence of adverse selection.3
Concerning annuity markets, the empirical literature rather uniformly concludes
that these are characterized by adverse selection. From a methodological point of view,
two different strands of empirical investigations of adverse selection in the market for
annuities can be distinguished. Roughly, the first strand compares mortality data of an-
nuitants with mortality data of non-annuitants or the general population, respectively.
This strand includes the large number of studies that apply the concept of Money’s
Worth to identify how much of an insurance premium’s deviation from the actuarily
fair premium can be attributed to selection effects. Friedman and Warshawsky,
1988, introduced the money’s worth approach that was later refined by Mitchell
et al., 1999. By now, the money’s worth is commonly understood as the expected net
present value of payouts in relation to premium costs which is calculated separately
using population and insurance mortality tables. Several studies applied this concept
to investigate the extent of adverse selection in annuity markets in various countries.
Most frequently studied are the markets in the US (Friedman and Warshawsky,
1990, and Mitchell et al., 1999) and in the UK (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002,
2004). Further examinations have been done for Germany (Gaudecker and Weber,
2004), Australia (Doyle et al., 2004) and Singapore (Doyle et al., 2004, and Fong,
2002), as well as for Canada, Chile, Israel and Switzerland (James and Song, 2001).
3See Cohen and Siegelman, 2010, for a recent review of the empirical literature on adverse selection
in insurance markets.
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McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010, and Rothschild, 2009, also compare mortality
tables of policyholders with those of the general population, but do not explicitly cal-
culate the money’s worth. All these studies find evidence for adverse selection which,
however, can only partially explain the annuity puzzle due to its limited extent.
The more recent second strand, where our study belongs to, analyzes adverse selec-
tion from the perspective of the policyholder using micro level data. While the focus
of the first strand lies on a quantitative estimation of the effects of adverse selection on
insurance premiums, the second strand is able to simultaneously assess the relevance of
subjective life expectancy and other determinants of annuity uptake. In addition, the
money’s worth does not allow to distinguish between active mortality selection based
on asymmetric information about health and expected longevity and passive mortality
selection reflecting other differences such as wealth and income that are also correlated
with mortality (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002). Due to data limitations, research
on the micro level is less frequently done. Most closely related to our analysis, is the
study by Brown et al., 2008a, who use data from the US Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). They investigate self-reported willingness of the elderly population to
exchange part of their social security inflation-indexed annuity benefit for an immediate
lump-sum payment by self-reported health status and subjective survival probabilities
relative to actuarial life tables. Their results are consistent with predictions of standard
theoretical models of adverse selection, since individuals with poor health-status and
pessimistic life expectations are less likely to annuitize, but tend to prefer lump-sum
payments. Another related study by Inkmann et al., 2011, uses the English Longitu-
dinal Study of Aging and investigates actual annuity uptake in the UK. In line with
Brown et al., 2008a, they find that the subjective survival probabilities of annuitants
are significantly higher than those of their non-policyholding counterparts which points
to the presence of adverse selection in the UK’s annuity market as well.
Our work differs from the existing studies in several aspects: Compared to the US
and the UK, Germany is characterized by a dominant public statutory system which
leaves a relatively smaller scope for supplementary private insurance. Consequently,
selection effects in the private pension insurance market in Germany are likely to differ
from those observed in the US and the UK. In contrast to Brown et al., 2008a,
who consider stated intentions to annuitize retirement income, we are able to observe
actual demand for private pension insurance of households. Compared to Inkmann
et al., 2011, we dispose of a more comprehensive set of variables, as we are able to
build proxies for preference parameters reflecting risk aversion and time preference
that are not included in their data. Unlike Brown et al., 2008a, and Inkmann
et al., 2011, we use subjective life expectancy in years instead of subjective survival
probabilities in percent. This overcomes the difficulties respondents might have with
thinking in probabilities, especially when it comes to very low or very large probabilities
as suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
2.3 The German old-age pension system 14
2.3 The German old-age pension system
For our further analysis, it is instructive to briefly examine the German old-age pension
system which consists of three coexisting pillars. Three things should be noted from
the following description. First, the public first pillar is still by far the most important
source of old-age income. Second, benefit levels from the first pillar differ for different
population groups mainly depending on their type of employment. Third, the private
pension insurance considered in our work is part of the third pillar and allows anyone
to supplement pre-existing benefits.
Introduced by Otto von Bismarck in 1889 as a fully funded system, the German
public old-age pension system was gradually converted into a PAYG system from 1957
on. Generosity was a key characteristic of the German system after the 1972 reform in
terms of both replacement rates and flexibility of retirement age. However, increasing
life expectancy in times of low fertility and the resulting population aging coupled with
negative incentive effects as well as the additional financing need after the German
reunification began to threaten the system. Starting with a major reform in 1992,
benefit cuts were implemented in an effort to stabilize its functioning (Börsch-Supan
and Wilke, 2004). Nowadays, the so-called first pillar of the three-pillar old-age
provision system comprises statutory pension insurance for all employees covered by
the German social security system, old-age security for farmers, professional provision
for certain groups of self-employed like physicians, lawyers and architects as well as
the civil-service pension scheme. Except for the self-employed who are at liberty to
participate and some other occupational groups like farmers or soldiers who can apply
for exemption from compulsory insurance, the whole work force is subject to mandatory
coverage within the first pillar. Although the relative importance of the three pillars
has changed in disfavor of the first pillar, it still constitutes the most important source
of old-age income. In 2007, the public pension scheme covered about 92% of the
German elderly and accounted for about 76% of total gross old-age income of all retirees
(Kortmann K. and Halbherr V. 2009).
The various subsystems within the first pillar, like the old-age security for farmers
or the civil-service pension scheme have neither historically been equally generous, nor
have they undergone benefit cuts in an equal measure. In particular, in 2007, persons
of age 65 and older whose last position was denoted as civil-servant, drew an average
monthly gross pension of 2670e from the public system. This amounted to an average
of 1195e for former blue- and white-collar worker and to only 813e for former farmers
and self-employed who were least secured by the public scheme (Kortmann K. and
Halbherr V. 2009).
Employees in the private and the public sector are free to supplement their benefits
from the mandatory statutory pension insurance by an occupational pension scheme
within the capital funded second pillar. This is typically organized in form of de-
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ferred compensations, where employees waive part of their salary in favor of employer-
provided retirement benefits. In 2007, benefits from occupational pension plans rep-
resented about 8% of total old-age income and accrued to 27% of the retirees (Ko-
rtmann K. and Halbherr V. 2009). Private old-age provision as the third pillar
involves additional accumulation of assets like investment funds, shares, real-estate,
private pension insurance and life insurance that can be depleted during retirement.
From 2002 and 2005 on, the third pillar also includes the state-subsidized Riester-
and Rürup pension plans. Overall, the third pillar accounted for 10% of total old-age
incomes in 2007 (Kortmann K. and Halbherr V. 2009).4
Our analysis of adverse selection in pension insurance focuses on the uptake of
private pension insurance within the third pillar because access to private pension
insurance is open for everybody and the uptake is purely voluntary. In our definition,
private pension insurance includes investment funds within the so-called Altersvorsorge-
Sondervermögen as their functioning is equivalent to regular private pension insurance.
This type of investment fund that was introduced in 1998 is specifically designed for
the provision of old age income and underlies a special regulation (see §§ 87–90 of the
German Investment Law). Riester- and Rürup pension plans are excluded because
of the state subsidies that distort their uptake and the unability to fully control for
eligibility for these subsidies with the data at hand.5
Anybody is at liberty to purchase a private pension policy to raise retirement in-
come. Individual premiums are generally calculated based on insurance mortality ta-
bles by age and gender. While benefits are usually paid out as a monthly pension,
most insurance companies offer the option of a single lump-sum payment, instead. In
both cases, a minimum benefit is guaranteed, while any profit bonus is uncertain and
depends on the development of the capital market. Insurance companies offer various
supplemental agreements for the standard policy, mostly related to dependants’ pro-
tection. In a standard contract, pensions are paid until the policyholder dies. In order
to avoid highly negative returns of investment, guarantee periods, survivor’s pensions
or contribution refund in case of early death can be agreed upon with the insurer.
These additional agreements all come at some cost in the sense of lower pensions for a
given monthly contribution. Finally, it should be noted that redemption of a purchased
4The remaining part of total gross old-age income that is not accounted for by the three pillars is
income from employment during retirement.
5The coexistence of subsidized and non-subsidized private pension products raises the question why
anybody takes up a non-subsidized product while a subsidized one is available. The main reasons
are: (i) a number of people are not eligible for the Riester subsidies like e. g. most self-employed,
marginally employed, students, social welfare recipients and people receiving disability benefits (see
§ 10a of the German Income Tax Act for the rather complex eligibility criteria), (ii) subsidies do
not automatically imply a high rate of return if the general contract conditions are disadvantageous
(Kleinlein, 2011) (iii) under the current legislation, Riester products are unattractive for those who
intend to spend their retirement abroad as they would have to pay back the subsidies in that case
and finally, (iv) in particular right after the introduction of the Riester pensions, the closing of a
contract was accompanied by a heavy administrative burden for the insurant (Oehler, 2009).
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policy is financially highly disadvantageous, since contributions for the first years are
used to cover broker remuneration and administrative expenses.
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2.4 Empirical analysis of insurance determinants
We now investigate the determinants of private pension insurance demand of German
households in a probit model. Section 2.4.1 describes the data and the derived variables.
The methodology is explained in Section 2.4.2 that also contains estimation results.
2.4.1 Data and derived variables
The cross-sectional data in use is the 2005 wave of the German SAVE study consisting
of 2305 households. SAVE is a nationally representative survey of German households
held by the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). With the
main focus on savings behavior, financial assets and old-age provision, the survey also
includes data on demographic, economic and psychologic characteristics of households.
A first experimental wave was launched in 2001. From 2005 on, SAVE is an annually
conducted panel of more than 2000 households.6
We choose the level of the analysis to be the household because we view old-age
provision as a household and not an individual task. Furthermore, the data only
contains information on insurance contracts of households and does not allow to dis-
tinguish between different policyholders within households. Our attention is restricted
to non-retired households where neither the head nor the spouse has retired because
old-age provision occurs before retirement. The dependent variable PPI in our probit
regression is a binary variable indicating whether a household holds a private pension
insurance policy in 2005.7 Independent variables are grouped into i) the theoretically
motivated explanatory variables life expectancy, risk and time preferences, ii) control
variables for substitutive old-age provision and financial literacy and iii) control vari-
ables for other household socioeconomic characteristics.
We base our analysis on the 2005 wave for two main reasons: First, this wave ex-
clusively contains relevant information on risk attitudes and time preferences. Second,
uptake of the alternative state-subsidized Riester pensions introduced in 2001 was low
until 2005, but gained momentum from that year on when the Retirement Income Act
greatly facilitated the subsidy procedure (BMAS, 2008). As the data constraints do
not allow us to fully control for subsidy eligibility, we restrict the sample to the 2005
wave where Riester uptake is still low and thus, demand for private pension insurance
6Details on the the design of the SAVE study can be found in Schunk, 2007, and Börsch-Supan
et al., 2008a. Item nonresponse in SAVE is adressed by an iterative multiple imputation procedure
using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. Provided a properly performed imputation, regression
based on multiply imputed data leads to efficiency gains and avoids potential biases from systematic
nonresponse. We will therefore take advantage of the five imputed data sets for SAVE 2005 provided
by MEA. For further information on the imputation procedure used in SAVE see Börsch-Supan
et al., 2008a, Schunk, 2008, and Ziegelmeyer, 2009, 2011.
7The precise wording in the survey is “Other contractually agreed private pension scheme, e. g. invest-
ment funds geared specifically to the provision of pension cover, private pension insurance policies
which are not promoted by the state or which were taken out before such support was available.”
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should be still rather unaffected.
The original sample size reduces to an estimation sample of 1320 households due
to the following exclusion rules: First, only non-retired households where neither the
head nor the spouse has retired are considered (836 observations). Second, we drop
households with inconsistent estimates of individual life expectancy, where the indi-
cated average life expectancy of people of their age and sex is less than current age
(5 observations). Third, all households with a missing value for the dependent vari-
able PPI are excluded (144 observations).8 16% of the final estimation sample hold a
private pension insurance.
i) Life expectancy, risk aversion and time preference
Average subjective life expectancy per household is calculated in three steps. First,
respondents are asked to estimate average life expectancy of men and women of their
age group (AV LEmale and AV LEfemale). Second, they indicate the number of years
they expect themselves to deviate from the average life expectancy of people of their
sex and age (EXPY EARSDEVhead). Also, they indicate the number of years they
expect their partner to deviate from the average life expectancy of his/her sex and age
(EXPY EARSDEVspouse). Subjective life expectancy for the household head is im-
plicitly given by this information and can be calculated as SLEhead = AV LE(fe)male +
EXPY EARSDEVhead. Calculation of subjective life expectancy for the spouse re-
lies on two (weak) assumptions: first, sex of the spouse is assumed to be opposite
to the one of the head, and, second, age of the spouse is assumed to be about the
same as the one of the head.9 10 It is then given by SLEspouse = AV LE(fe)male +
EXPY EARSDEVspouse. Average subjective life expectancy for partner households is
finally derived as AV SLE = (SLEhead + SLEspouse)/2.
Risk attitudes and time preferences of the household head are indirectly inferred
from hypothetical choices inquired in the survey. Table 2.1 displays the two sets of
options that are used for their derivation. In the first set, people are requested to
choose between options A and B in three different hypothetical lotteries. A is always
a certain zero, while B implies a 50% chance of loosing 100e and a 50% chance of
winning 200e, 300e and 400e, respectively. RISKAV ERSE is a dummy variable
8We exclude observations with an imputed dependent variable for two reasons; first, estimation ef-
ficiency and second and more importantly, robustness to problems with the underlying imputation
model (see Hippel, 2007 for a discussion of imputed dependent variables in regression analysis.).
However, to verify insensitivity of the results to the inclusion of cases with missing dependent vari-
able, we provide estimation results including these observations in Table A.4 in the appendix.
9We view even the latter assumption as non-critical, since, on average, the household head is only
0.17 years older than his or her spouse in the 864 partner households with a standard deviation of
5.31 years.
10In a similar manner, Brown, 2001, Brown et al., 2008a, and Inkmann et al., 2011, refer to
individual expected survival probabilities. Data limitations force most other studies to make either
use of aggregate mortality tables or the less nuanced self-assessed health status as a proxy.
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that is equal to one for the most risk averse individuals who always opt for A, even in
the third lottery where potential payment in B is highest. This is the case for 65% of
our sample.
First Set 1 2 3
A 100% 0 0 0
B 50% -100 -100 -100
50% 200 300 400
Second Set 1 2 3
A now -800 -800 -800
B in 10 months -825 -870 -990
Source: The German SAVE study 2005.
Table 2.1: Hypothetical choices to elicit risk and time preferences
In the second set, the hypothetical choice is not between certain and uncertain
payments, but between payments at different points in time. In each scenario, A is
an immediate payment of 800e, while B is a payment of 825e, 870e and 990e in
10 months. IMPATIENT is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the most
impatient individuals that always opt for paying in 10 months even if the postponed
payment is highest.11 11% of the sample are classified as impatient here. We are only
able to infer preferences of the household head, but not of the spouse which, however,
is less a concern since the head states to be involved in financial decision-making in
95% of all cases.
ii) Financial literacy and substitutive old-age provision
Since old-age provision is a complex matter that requires a certain degree of knowl-
edge in financial affairs, we account for the financial literacy of households by their
stock market participation. More precisely, FINLIT is a dummy variable indicating
whether the household holds equity and real-estate funds or other financial assets like
equity bonds, discount certificates, hedge funds, wind power funds, film funds and
other financial innovations. Stock market participation is an appropriate proxy for
financial literacy as investment in this type of assets reveals a certain level of financial
11Comparable measures for risk aversion based on hypothetical lottery choices inquired in surveys are
used by Brown et al., 2008a, and Salm, 2010. Cutler et al., 2008, furthermore suggest indicators
like drinking and smoking behavior, job-based mortality risk, preventive care and the use of seat
belts that are also frequently used. An analogous measure of time preference is derived by Brown
et al., 2008a, from an experimental module in the 2004 HRS. Other studies rely on the length of the
financial planning horizon to proxy for time preferences (Brown et al., 2008a, and Salm, 2010).
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sophistication (Van Rooij et al., 2011).12 13
As private pension insurance is only one component of overall old-age provision,
we need to take into account expected benefits from the first and second pillar as
well as other types of third pillar old-age provision like real estate property, Riester
pension plans, equity funds etc. We use the type of employment of the main earner
in order to approximate the expected benefit level from the first pillar of the old-
age provision system due to the previously noted substantially varying benefit levels
by type of employment. Employment is classified in four categories: civil servant
(CIV SERV ), white/blue-collar worker (WORKER), self-employed (SELFEMPL)
and unemployed (UNEMPL).
Part of the population is eligible to occupational pension schemes and the govern-
ment-subsidized Riester pension plans. We control for benefits from these sources by a
variable containing the end of December 2004 balances of occupational pension schemes
and Riester contracts (OTHINS). We also control for private wealth, separately for
financial wealth and other rather illiquid types of wealth. FINWEALTH is the sum
of all net financial assets excluding pension insurance in 1000e. OTHWEALTH
contains all other types of net wealth, i.e. business property, real property and other
assets in 10000e. In some estimation specifications, these types of substitutive old-age
provision are adjusted by equivalence scales to account for differing financial needs of
single and partner households (FINWEALTHEQ, OTHWEALTH, OTHINSEQ).
We divide insurance balances and wealth by 1.5 for partner households following the
modified OECD equivalence scale that assigns a weight of 0.5 to the second adult in
a household. Additionally, we include the squared equivalence scale adjusted wealth
(FINWEALTHEQ2 and OTHWEALTH2) to take possible nonlinear effects into
account.
iii) Socioeconomic characteristics
Finally, we control for households’ socioeconomic characteristics that we assess to be
relevant for the insurance choice. Average age, AGE, is supposed to represent the
maturity status of the household in its life cycle. AGE2, the squared average age, is
12The related empirical literature uses various other measures to capture financial literacy. Brown,
2001, and Inkmann et al., 2011, rely on the general education level, while Mottola and Utkus,
2007, gather from demographic characteristics to financial experience. Yet others use contact with
tax advisors (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b) or create indices by dint of direct investigations in
surveys (Agnew et al., 2008, Brown et al., 2008a, and Bucher-Koenen, 2009).
13From 2007 to 2009, SAVE contains quiz-like questions to capture the respondents’ financial literacy.
Assuming financial literacy to be constant over time and applying this measure to households for
which it is available, however, would result in a loss of sample size of about 30%. Instead, we use these
later waves to validate our proxy: Correlations between stockmarket participation and correctness
of answers to the financial literacy questions are substantial and highly significant. For instance,
the tetrachoric correlation between stockmarket participation and a binary variable indicating three
out of three correctly answered questions lies between 0.4 and 0.5 depending on the wave and is
significantly different from zero at levels of less than 0.001.
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included to allow for a possible nonlinear effect of age. PARTNER is a dummy vari-
able designed to distinguish partner and single households. Alternatively, we include
MARRIED that identifies married respondents. NRCHILD equals the number of
children and stepchildren of the head and his spouse.14 EAST is a dummy variable that
characterizes households located in Eastern Germany. INCOME(EQ(2)) is the net
(equivalent(squared)) income of the household that should control for its purchasing
power and possible nonlinear effects.15
Generally note the following: We observe holdings of private pension insurance
and household characteristics in 2005 or end December 2004. Theory suggests that
starting from a situation without an insurance policy, a household implicitly calculates
his net benefit from buying insurance in any given period. If this benefit is positive, the
household buys a private pension insurance policy. In consecutive periods, the problem
changes into the one of keeping or selling the previously bought policy. Selling a policy
implies a financial loss due to administrative expenses. A critical point in our analysis
is that we are unable to distinguish between new and old policyholders. Hence, there
might be households in our sample that keep a policy though they would not buy it
if they could newly decide in 2005. It would therefore be meaningful to run a similar
analysis on the uptake of private pension insurance policies with panel data which,
however, requires a larger sample size and a stable panel structure. Means of the
variables and their correlations for the estimation sample are given in Tables 2.2 and
2.3.
2.4.2 Estimation and results
To estimate determinants of private pension insurance uptake, we specify a probit
model with the dichotomous dependent variable PPIi for all households i = 1 . . . N .
PPIi takes the value one for households holding a private pension insurance policy
in 2005. As usual, we estimate the probit model by maximum-likelihood estimation.
To deal with item non-response, we take advantage of the five multiply imputed data
sets provided by MEA and combine the separate complete-data results by the method
known as Rubin’s Rule. This method averages estimated coefficients across datasets
14The presence of children is accounted for to capture a possible bequest motive in old-age provision
(Hurd, 1987, Bernheim, 1991, Johnson et al., 2004, Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b, and Inkmann
et al., 2011). Yet other authors rely on self-reported importance of bequest motives (Brown, 2001)
or the existence of a will or trust (Brown et al., 2008a).
15In contrast to the substitutive old-age provision where we only adjust for a partner, we also account
for children when calculating net equivalent income. The reason is that the ability to pay insurance
premiums from current income depends on the presence of children, whereas retirement income
typically only serves the financial needs of the parents. Calculation of net equivalent income of
a household conceptually again follows the modified OECD equivalence scale. Some specifications
contain the net equivalent income, others the unadjusted net income. We also considered an alterna-
tive income measure roughly adjusted for subsistence income as defined by the Hartz IV regulations
which, however, left our results unaffected.
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Estimation Sample PPI=1 PPI=0
N=1320 N=206 (16%) N=1114 (84%)
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
AVSLE 78.85 7.55 80.12 7.01 78.62 7.63
RISKAVERSE* 0.65 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.65 0.48
IMPATIENT* 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.33
FINLIT* 0.22 0.41 0.39 0.49 0.19 0.39
UNEMPL* 0.22 0.42 0.07 0.26 0.25 0.43
CIVSERV* 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.23
WORKER* 0.62 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.62 0.49
SELFEMPL* 0.09 0.29 0.18 0.39 0.08 0.27
AGE 40.41 11.12 40.29 8.87 40.43 11.48
NRCHILD 1.50 1.32 1.42 1.16 1.51 1.35
PARTNER* 0.63 0.48 0.74 0.44 0.61 0.49
MARRIED* 0.57 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.50
EAST* 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47
FINWEALTHEQ 1.73 14.84 2.92 6.91 1.51 15.83
FINWEALTH 2.44 22.18 4.10 9.86 2.14 23.71
OTHWEALTHEQ 10.08 53.32 11.57 34.00 9.82 55.75
OTHWEALTH 14.01 77.77 16.70 50.82 13.53 81.17
INCOMEEQ 1362.52 1576.31 1745.27 2413.73 1294.35 1365.06
INCOME 2305.68 2638.93 2970.89 3366.59 2187.20 2470.17
OTHINSEQ 1862.82 7881.20 3454.93 11322.42 1579.26 7062.55
OTHINS 2625.38 10998.41 4885.96 15799.32 2222.77 9854.25
Note: Sample means are weighted using sample weights and averaged over the five datasets.
Variables marked with * are dummy variables.
Source: The German SAVE study 2005. Own calculations.
Table 2.2: Sample means of dependent and independent variables by private pension insur-
ance holdings
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and takes within-imputation and between-imputation variances into account when cal-
culating standard errors of the estimates (Rubin, 1987).
We distinguish between a model with purely theory-led explanatory variables and
six different specifications where vectors of previously derived control variables Xi are
included. The underlying latent model is thus specified as
PPI∗i = β1 +β2AV SLEi+β3RISKAV ERSEi+β4IMPATIENTi(+Xiβ)+εi. (2.1)
Table 2.4 displays average marginal effects calculated using Rubin’s Rules for multi-
ply imputed data for the model without control variables and six different specifications
with control variables.16 Let us first consider the model without control variables. As
illustrated in the first column of Table 2.4, estimation results closely correspond to our
expectations. In particular, average subjective life expectancy significantly positively
influences the demand for private pension insurance. Other things being equal, house-
holds who expect to become old, are more likely to purchase supplementary private
pension insurance than those who expect to die young. Quantitatively, the effect seems
to be small, i. e. if subjective life expectancy increases by one year, the probability of
having PPI increases by 0.3 percentage points, but it is statistically significant at a
level of 1.3 percent. Risk averse individuals should be more willing to insure their
longevity risk and thus exhibit a larger likelihood of having private pension insurance.
Correspondingly, the marginal effect of risk aversion on private pension insurance up-
take is positive, but insignificant. Since investment in pension insurance postpones
today’s consumption to tomorrow, individuals with high time preference should buy
private pension insurance less frequently than their patient counterparts. As expected,
a high rate of time preference is associated with a low predicted probability of having
private pension insurance. With a p-value of 0.002, this relationship is highly significant
in the model without the vector of control variables.
Now, let us direct our attention to the model specifications with control variables
in columns three to eight of Table 2.4. Estimation results for this model prove to be
robust across the six specifications. Compared to the model without control variables,
our previous results remain qualitatively stable. As before, the probability of having
private pension insurance significantly increases with average subjective life expectancy.
We therefore conclude that people rationally take expectations about lifetime into
account when deciding on old-age provision. Combined with the predictive power of
subjective expectations of lifetime, this indicates risk-based selection due to private
16Marginal effects can be either evaluated at fixed values of the independent variables, typcially the
means, or averaged over all observations. The first are called marginal effects at the mean (MEM),
while the latter are referred to as average marginal effects (AME). The main argument in favor
of AME is the fact that sample means used during the calculation of MEM might refer to either
nonexistent or nonsensical observations (Bartus, 2005). For comparison, we also calculated the
MEM which are almost identical to the AME (see Table A.3 in the appendix).
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information. Hence, our investigation of the German annuity market confirms the
common finding that annuity markets are in fact characterized by adverse selection.
The impact of risk aversion on pension insurance is again estimated to be insignifi-
cantly positive. Thus, preference-driven selection based on risk aversion does not seem
to play a major role in the annuitization decision. This conflicts the emerging liter-
ature on propitious or advantageous selection based on risk aversion that emphasizes
selection effects driven by risk attitudes instead of riskiness (Hemenway, 1990, De
Meza and Webb, 2001). Besides the admittedly noisy proxy, a potential explanation
is collinearity of risk aversion and subjective life expectancy. This would hold, if risk
aversion increased life expectancy due to more cautious health behavior and if indi-
viduals rationally took this effect into account when building their expectations about
lifetime. Simple cross-correlation analysis as given in Table 2.3, however, throws doubt
on this explanation because the correlation coefficient is close to zero and even slightly
negative. Instead, we attribute insignificance of the marginal effect of risk aversion to
a framing effect (Brown et al., 2008b). People might view private pension insurance
policies as a type of investment rather than insurance. Due to its dependency on the
ex ante unknown lifetime, return on investment in private pension insurance policies is
relatively uncertain. In this regard, risk averse people should less frequently invest in
pension insurance. Our result closely corresponds to Brown et al., 2008a, who use a
similar proxy for risk aversion. In most of their specifications, more risk averse people
do not exhibit a significantly higher likelihood of taking annuities instead of a lump-
sum payment. In contrast, Cutler et al., 2008, find the expected relationship between
risk-related behavior and annuitization. Smokers or individuals with risky jobs are less
likely to be covered by annuities, whereas individuals that undertake preventive health
activities or those who always wear seatbelts are more likely to be covered by annuities.
While it is still estimated to be negative, the marginal effect of time preference
on the probability of having private pension insurance becomes insignificant once the
control variables are taken into consideration. Using an analogous proxy for time
preference, Brown et al., 2008a, also do not detect a robust relationship between
time preference and annuity uptake. According to his result, patient individuals tend
to be less likely to prefer the annuity over the lump-sum payment which, however, is
significant at the 10 percent level in only two out of five specifications. We conclude
that the effect is mainly attributed to other characteristics of the household than their
time preference. A possible candidate is financial literacy which seems to play an
outstanding role in the demand for private pension insurance. The probability of having
private pension insurance is about 10 percentage points higher in financially literate
than in financially illiterate households which is significant at the 1 percent level. This
result is in line with the recent literature on the relationship between financial literacy,
retirement planning ability and retirement saving (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007,
2007, 2011, and Van Rooij et al., 2011) and is also supported by Brown et al.,
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2008a, and Bucher-Koenen, 2009.
Benefit levels from the first pillar proxied by the type of employment also have
substantial explanatory power. With the base category being the unemployed, the
marginal effect of a self-employed main earner who is least covered by the public pension
system is largest as expected. Thus, pre-existing annuities tend to crowd out private
pension insurance uptake which ought to be the case according to Mitchell et al.,
1999, and Dushi and Webb, 2004, and is empirically confirmed by Bernheim, 1991.
According to our results, the predicted probability also increases with being a worker
or a civil servant. There, the marginal effect of being a civil servant exceeds that of
being a worker. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive due to the relatively more
generous benefit levels for civil servants. An explanation might be a more cautious and
provident attitude of civil servants on average that is not covered by other regressors.
On the one hand, wealth, in particular financial wealth, increases the afforability
of private pension insurance. On the other hand, it works as a substitute to insur-
ance. Rather surprisingly, the monetary variables of (equivalent) net wealth, balance
in other insurance-type old-age provision and household income do not determine in-
surance demand. Wealthy households run a lower risk of depleting their assets before
death so that wealth is theoretically supposed to negatively impact the probability of
opting for supplementary private pension insurance. This effect should be particularly
pronounced for illiquid assets like housing or business property that reduce the re-
quired replacement rate from pension insurance. In contrast, for liquid financial assets
a positive impact might dominate due to the increasing affordability of private pen-
sion insurance. Actually, the signs of our estimated effects point into these directions.
However, in accordance with Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b, Brown et al., 2008a, and
Inkmann et al., 2011, we do not find any significant relationship in our data. A likely
reason are the opposing effects of increased substitution and increased affordability
with rising wealth. In a similar manner, other insurance-type old-age provision can be
seen as a substitute to private pension insurance such that a negative relationship is
expected again. However, we again do not see evidence of substitution between dif-
ferent sources of old-age income. Instead, ahead thinking households tend to rely on
several sources of old-age income. This finding is in line with other studies that also
find a positive relationship between participation in alternative old-age provision and
uptake of private pension plans (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b, and Inkmann et al.,
2011).17 Finally, net (equivalent) household income also does not seem to play a role in
the uptake of private pension insurance. While Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b, estimate
a weakly significant positive impact of income on pension insurance uptake, our result
corresponds to Brown et al., 2008a.18
17Note, however, that Inkmann et al., 2011, only find this for a subsample of stockholders.
18Presumably, household income is an important determinant of the amount of insurance purchased
because of higher purchasing power and higher standard of living that needs to be insured. In
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As the average age of its members increases, a household’s probability to purchase
private pension insurance increases, but at a decreasing rate. Aggravating population
aging and raising awareness of decreasing replacement rates of the public pension sys-
tem should lead to a larger probability of supplementary pension insurance in young
households. The youngest households, however, possibly have not yet fully adressed
the matter of old-age provion which explains the observed nonlinearity. Whether the
respondent is married or lives in a partner household, does not seem to influence the
insurance decision. Thus, we do not find evidence for intra-household risk pooling
theoretically suggested by Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981. In contrast to Brown and
Poterba, 2000, who find higher annuity demand among singles than couples, our
results correspond to Brown et al., 2008a.
Households in Eastern Germany are more likely to purchase private pension in-
surance than their Western German counterparts. This might be explained by lower
expected public pension replacement rates of the Eastern German population due to
less continuous employment biographies and lower average income subject to contri-
bution payments (Krenz and Nagl, 2009).19 Interestingly, if the number of children
increases by one, the probability of having private pension insurance falls by about
two percentage points. We interpret this statistically significant effect as evidence for
a bequest motive or expected intergenerational transfer from children to their par-
ents during retirement. As mentioned by Bernheim, 1991, children’s altruism might
function as a “safety net” that makes pension insurance less needed. Our finding cor-
responds to the empirical results by Bernheim, 1991. However, quite a number of
studies does not find an empirical indication of bequest motives in old-age provision
(Hurd, 1987, Brown, 2001, Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b, Brown et al., 2008a, and
Inkmann et al., 2011).
principal, we could estimate a two-stage model with the amount as the dependent variable in the
second stage. Unfortunately, data on private pension insurance premium in force and contributions
to the scheme prove to be unreliable such that we restrict our attention to the binary variable PPI.
19For a detailed income decomposition of the German elderly in the Old and New Laender see Bönke
et al., 2010.
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2.5 Conclusion
We investigate determinants of private pension insurance uptake of German households
using the 2005 SAVE survey on savings and old-age provision. In a comprehensive
assessment of the relevant factors suggested by theory and previous empirical work,
we simultaneously estimate their importance in a multivariate framework. Our main
finding is that households take advantage of private information on expected lifetime
in the pension insurance choice. Conditional on other relevant variables, households
expecting to become old, are relatively more likely to take up supplementary private
pension insurance. More precisely, the probability of having supplementary private
pension insurance increases by about 0.3 percentage points with each additional year
of expected lifetime. This indicates the presence of adverse selection in the German
annuities market.
We also find financial literacy and pre-existing annuities to play a prominent role
in the insurance decision. Financially literate households, identified by their active
participation in the stock market, are significantly more likely to hold private pension
insurance policies. Pre-existing annuities from the quantitatively most important pub-
lic pension system, tend to crowd out private insurance. Civil servants and workers
are less likely to have supplementary private insurance than households with a self-
employed main earner who are typically not covered by the public system, though
this difference is significant only for the case of the workers. In addition, the number
of children is negatively related to the probability of private pension insurance. This
can be interpreted as an indication of bequest motives or expected intergenerational
altruism. According to our results, uptake of private pension insurance does not differ
between single and partner households.
In addition, we only find very limited evidence for the theoretically suggested im-
portance of risk aversion and time preference. Our measure of risk aversion has no
explanatory power in the pension insurance choice. This might be explained by the
fact that a pension policy cannot only be seen as insurance, but also as a type of in-
vestment. On the one hand, the insurance character of private pensions that protects
the insurant from longevity risk should be appreciated by risk averse households. On
the other hand, the relatively uncertain return on a pension policy that depends on the
ex ante unknown length of life tends to retain risk averse households from purchase.
These two opposing effects might therefore explain the lacking explanatory power of
our measure of risk aversion. Time preference has the expected negative coefficient,
but it becomes insignificant as control variables are taken into account.
This work contributes to the literature on adverse selection in annuities markets.
Our result is in line with a number of related studies primarily focusing on the UK
and US that also find evidence for adverse selection in annuities markets. While most
of these studies make use of the money’s worth concept to detect adverse selection, we
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use micro level data and approach the issue from the perspective of the insurant. To
our knowledge, we are the first to investigate adverse selection in the German annuities
market at the household level. From the policy point of view, our work suggests that
the private pension insurance market is in fact characterized by inefficiencies related
to adverse selection. Difficulties arise for low risk individuals for whom insurance in
the private pension market is prohibitively expensive. Policy makers should therefore
keep in mind that privately insuring longevity risk is not without difficulty for part of
the population.
For future research, it would be meaningful to conduct a comparable analysis using
panel data that allows to observe household characteristics directly at the time of
annuity purchase. Since our indicators of risk and time preferences are rather rough,
we additionally consider it worthwhile to construct more sophisticated measures of
preferences in surveys. This would provide deeper insight in preference-driven selection
in insurance markets. Finally, it would be interesting to follow the development of the
German pension system and address to adverse selection in Riester pension plans.
While cautiously demanded in the beginning, holding of these increased to about 14
million contracts in end of 2010. Possibly, the design of the subsidy scheme that
strongly incentivizes specific parts of the population to take up Riester plans, outruns
the importance of life expectancy for profitability of the policies and thus reduces
adverse selection.
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Chapter 3
Choice under Risk: Experimental
Evidence from Ethiopia
3.1 Introduction
The present paper studies risk preferences of small-holder farmers in a developing
country. We move beyond a pure investigation of risk attitudes in the tradition of
Holt and Laury, 2002, but more generally inquire the structure of risk preferences.
In particular, we experimentally test whether choices under risk are consistent with
the predictions of expected utility theory and the criterion of first-order stochastic
dominance.
Expected utility theory is the dominant theory of decision making under risk in
economics. It relies on a set of axioms -completeness, transitivity, continuity and
independence- that define a rational decision maker (Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944). We test for consistency of choices with the independence axiom imposed in ex-
pected utility theory using a common ratio version of the Allais paradox. The common
ratio problem is an experimental design developed by Allais, 1953, based on observed
choices over two pairs of lotteries. The first choice is used to infer the individual risk
attitude. The second choice then provides a test of consistency with the property of
ratio independence implied by expected utility theory (Harrison et al., 2003). There
is considerable evidence from the developed world that subjects behave less risk averse
in the second choice problem than in the first. This common ratio effect is a system-
atic property of individual behaviour which, however, cannot be explained by expected
utility theory (Camerer, 1995).
First-order stochastic dominance is a rational principle of decision making that
posits that stochastically dominating gambles are preferred over stochastically domi-
nated gambles. A gamble A first-order stochastically dominates a gamble B if for any
monetary outcome x, A gives an at least as high probability of receiving at least x as
B does, and for some x, A gives a higher probability of receiving at least x. Expected
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utility theory as well as various other descriptive decision theories like rank-dependent
expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory predict consistency of choices
with the property of stochastic dominance (Birnbaum, 1999b). In contrast, config-
ural weight theory, the most prominent theory of decision making under risk with
non-linear weighting of probabilities in the psychological literature, implies violations
of this property (see Birnbaum and McIntosh, 1996).
While studies of risk aversion in developing countries are numerous (Binswanger,
1980, 1981, 1982, Henrich and McElreath, 2002, Humphrey and Verschoor,
2004, 2004, Harrison et al., 2009, Akay et al., 2011, and Hardeweg et al., 2011),
only few studies address the descriptive adequacy of expected utility theory in develop-
ing countries. Exceptions are the studies of Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004a and
Harrison et al., 2009 that comprehensively analyze violations of expected utility, but
do not consider first-order stochastic dominance. Altogether, their results are similar to
what has been observed in experiments with students in industrialized countries. The
authors conclude that expected utility theory does not appropriately describe behavior,
but non-linear weighting of probabilities has to be considered in order to organize the
data.
Similarly, it has been extensively studied, how risk aversion varies with sociode-
mographic characteristics (see e.g. Harrison et al., 2007), but empirical evidence on
the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and violations of expected
utility theory or stochastic dominance is very rare. The study by Huck and Müller,
2012, provides a recent contribution on the sociodemographic covariates of the Allais
paradox using a representative sample from the Netherlands. They find that education,
income and asset holdings are related with violations of expected utility theory. We
are not aware of a comparable study considering sociodemographic covariates of such
behavioral patterns in a developing country.
We contribute to the literature by investigating consistency of decision making
of poor subjects in a developing country with expected utility theory and stochastic
dominance and the influence of sociodemographic characteristics of the subjects on their
decision making. Our research objectives are twofold. First, we aim to assess whether
violations of expected utility theory in the form of a common ratio effect and stochastic
dominance observed in the developed world carry over to a sample from the developing
world. Second, we want to investigate which personal characteristics are correlated
with violations of expected utility theory and stochastic dominance. We put special
emphasis on the relationship between the educational level of the subject and violation
rates because recent studies suggest that a range of behavioral biases are correlated
with cognitive abilities (Burks et al., 2009, Dohmen et al., 2010, Benjamin et al.,
2012, Huck and Müller, 2012).
For these purposes, we combine experimental tests with high monetary stakes
with a survey capturing sociodemographic characteristics of small-holder farmers from
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Ethiopia. The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the general setting,
the design of the experimental tasks and how they were embedded in the survey. Sec-
tion 3.3 provides a descriptive and an econometric analysis of the data. Section 3.4
concludes.
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3.2 Experimental design
Our study includes four experimental tasks on individual decision making under risk
which were performed by participants to a larger household survey. The experimental
tasks involve tests of consistency with expected utility theory and with transparent
and non-transparent first-order stochastic dominance as well as a standard elicitation
of the risk attitude of the household head following Holt and Laury, 2002 (details
see below). We supplemented the experimental tasks with a questionnaire capturing
detailed information on individual and household attributes as well as a record of all
income generating activities of the household.
The study was conducted based on a sample of Ethiopian small-holder farmers from
the East and West Shewa Zones of the Region of Oromia in spring 2011. The sample
of farmers was randomly drawn from member lists of twelve agricultural cooperatives
in the survey area. In total, we sampled 366 farmers from 23 different communities.
Trained and experienced enumerators conducted the experiments and interviews face to
face in the local language Oromifa. Completing the questionnaire and the experimental
tasks took about 1.5 hours.
In order to continuously draw the respondents’ attention and to make the interview
diversified and enjoyable for participants we conducted the experiments at two different
points in time in the course of the interview. The Holt-Laury elicitation of risk attitudes
was conducted after the introductory sections on the household demographics and
dwelling characteristics. The common ratio experiment was run almost at the end
of the interview, immediately followed by the stochastic dominance questions. All
experiments were explained and visually presented in terms of urns containing beads
where the color of the bead determines the payoff.
When performing a choice task, subjects were not aware of the fact that additional
paid experiments would be performed at later stages. In the Holt-Laury and the
common ratio experiments, standard random lottery incentive systems were applied.
Choices to be played out for real were determined by the subjects who rolled a ten-sided
die in the Holt-Laury experiment and flipped a coin in the common ratio experiment.
The stochastic dominance choices were both played for real. Payouts were disbursed
in cash immediately upon completion of the interview. The range of possible total
payouts was 5-70 ETB with an average total payout of 50 ETB, which amounts to
approximately 3 USD. This corresponds to more than a daily wage of an unskilled
farm laborer in the area of the study.
3.2.1 Consistency with expected utility theory
We test consistency of preferences with expected utility using a standard common
ratio problem. The variant we employ follows Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and
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is depicted in Figure 3.1. In the first choice problem, subjects have to chose between
a degenerate lottery with a certain payout of 15 and a lottery that gives a payout of
20 with probability 0.8 and a payout of 0 with probability 0.2. Lotteries in the second
choice problem are derived from initial lotteries by adding a front end probability of
0.75 of winning zero. That is, the resulting lotteries offer a 0.25 chance of playing the
initial lotteries and a 0.75 chance of winning zero. Because the second choice is derived
from the first by multiplication with a common ratio from the interval (0, 1), problems
of this type are known as common ratio problems (Birnbaum, 1999b).
If we normalize the utility function u such that u(0) = 0, an expected utility
maximizer chooses the safe lottery in the first choice problem if u(15) > 0.8u(20).
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by 0.25 yields 0.25u(15) > 0.2u(20). Thus,
expected utility theory implies that a subject that chooses the safe lottery in the first
choice, also chooses the safe lottery in the second choice and vice versa. The typically
observed pattern of choosing safe in the first problem and risky in the second one is,
however, incompatible with expected utility theory.
Figure 3.1: The common ratio effect
100 x  (15 Birr) 80 x  (20 Birr)
20 x  (0 Birr)
25 x  (15 Birr)
75 x  (0 Birr)
20 x  (20 Birr)
80 x  (0 Birr)
Choice 2
Choice 1
Note: In each choice problem, we asked subjects to select one out of two transparent bags
containing 100 wooden beads of the indicated colors. Legends with monetary values of the
different colors and the number of beads of the different colors in the bags were attached to
the bags. We used different nuances of a given color within each choice problem to ensure
that choices are not driven by cultural meanings of colors or favorite colors.
3.2.2 Consistency with stochastic dominance
We test consistency of preferences with stochastic dominance using two choice prob-
lems. The first offers a transparent dominance relation, the second an intransparent
dominance relation following the design of Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998.
The transparent dominance test is shown in Figure 3.2. The left lottery offers a
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0.6 chance of winning 5 and a 0.4 chance of winning 1. The right lottery offers a 0.5
chance of winning 3 and a 0.5 chance of winning 1. It is easy to see that the left lottery
dominates the right one as probability and size of the better payoff are higher.
The main purpose of this test is to control whether subjects can process the offered
stimuli properly. This seemed particularly important to us in view of the fact that
most subjects were unfamiliar with the type of decision problems at hand. The test
also serves to control whether subjects are attentive, which, however, can readily be
expected given the size of payoffs.
Figure 3.2: Transparent stochastic dominance
6 x  (5 Birr)
4 x  (1 Birr)
5 x  (3 Birr)
5 x  (1 Birr)
The intransparent stochastic dominance test is shown in Figure 3.3. The left lottery
(L) stochastically dominates the right lottery (R) as P (x ≥ t|L) ≥ P (x ≥ t|R) for all
t, where P (x ≥ t|L) denotes the probability that an outcome in lottery L is equal to
or exceeds t.
It is also easy to verify that L stochastically dominates R by considering a third
lottery A in which you win 20 with a probability of 0.9 and 3 with a probability of 0.1.
As L evidently dominates A while R is dominated by A, choosing lottery R constitutes
a violation of stochastic dominance.
Figure 3.3: Intransparent stochastic dominance
90 x  (20 Birr)
5 x  (5 Birr)
5 x  (3 Birr)
85 x  (20 Birr)
5 x  (18 Birr)
10 x  (3 Birr)
3.2.3 Risk attitudes
Our experimental elicitation of risk attitudes follows the standard procedure of Holt
and Laury, 2002, with ten choices, each between a relatively safe alternative A and a
more risky alternative B. In the first choice, the risky alternative B is very unattractive
as the probability of winning the high amount (25 Birr ≈ 1.50 USD) is very low (0.1).
The probability of winning the high amount increases from choice to choice by 0.1
until it amounts to one in the last choice, so that B dominates A in the last choice (see
Table 3.1; expected values in the last three columns were not shown to subjects).
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The point at which a subject switches from the safe lottery A to the risky lottery B
allows inferring his coefficient of relative risk aversion. A higher number of safe choices
corresponds to a higher degree of risk aversion (seeHolt and Laury, 2002, for details).
A risk neutral subject would choose A in the first four rounds and B thereafter. We
appropriately scaled payouts used in Holt and Laury, 2002, for our purposes such
that they cover the range of payoffs used in the common ratio and stochastic dominance
experiments.
Table 3.1: Elicitation of risk attitudes
A B
Choice p(x1) x1 x2 x1 x2 E[x]A E[x]B E[x]A − E[x]B
1 0.1 13 11 25 1 11.2 3.4 7.8
2 0.2 13 11 25 1 11.4 5.8 5.6
3 0.3 13 11 25 1 11.6 8.2 3.4
4 0.4 13 11 25 1 11.8 10.6 1.2
5 0.5 13 11 25 1 12 13 -1
6 0.6 13 11 25 1 12.2 15.4 -3.2
7 0.7 13 11 25 1 12.4 17.8 -5.4
8 0.8 13 11 25 1 12.6 20.2 -7.6
9 0.9 13 11 25 1 12.8 22.6 -9.8
10 1 13 11 25 1 13 25 -12
Note: 16.67 Birr=1 USD.
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3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Descriptive analysis
We start our analysis by looking at the results for the common ratio effect in Table 3.2.
About 60% of subjects behave in accordance with expected utility theory by choosing
either both times A or both times B. 40% display a common ratio effect which casts
doubt on the decriptive adequacy of the independence axiom implied by expected
utility theory in our sample. These numbers are in line with previous research in
developed countries (seeCamerer, 1995, and Starmer, 2000, for recent surveys of the
evidence). Existing evidence from developing countries also points to similar violation
rates. Using a common consequence version of the Allais paradox, Humphrey and
Verschoor, 2004b, observe an overall violation rate of expected utility theory of 64%
in a sample from India, Ethiopia and Uganda.
The violations are systematic in the sense that the pattern AB is more frequently
observed than the opposite pattern BA. According to the test statistic of Conlisk,
1989, the asymmetry of violations is highly significant (z = 3.95, p < 0.01). The
asymmetry of violations is in line with previous results (see e.g. Cubitt et al., 1998,
Loomes and Sugden, 1998). It can be explained by the fanning-out hypothesis put
forward by Machina, 1982, according to which subjects become less risk averse when
moving from dominating to dominated lotteries.
Table 3.2: The common ratio effect
n %
AA 93 25.48
BB 125 34.25
AB 97 26.58
BA 50 13.70
365 100
Our results for the tests of stochastic dominance are presented in Table 3.3. We
observe a violation rate of transparent dominance amounting to 7.1%. This rate is
only slightly higher than the one usually observed with students in developed coun-
tries. For instance, Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998, report a violation rate of
transparent dominance of 4.7% among undergraduate students at an American univer-
sity. Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that the farmers understood the tasks in
our experiments sufficiently well.
55.34% of the sample violate non-transparent stochastic dominance. With a z-score
of 2.0414, a binomial test rejects the null hypothesis that the violation rate is 50% in
favor of the alternative hypothesis that it is greater than 50% at a significance level of
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0.02. We thus conclude that the violation rate of non-transparent stochastic dominance
in our sample is significantly greater than 50%.1 The observed violation rate of 55.34%
is roughly in line with previous studies in developed countries and even seems to be
somewhat lower. Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998, report a violation rate of 70%.
Birnbaum, 1999, 2000, observe a violation rate of 57.4% in an internet sample and
72.2% in a lab sample.
We conclude that violations of stochastic dominance which are common even amongst
highly educated subjects in the developed world also occur in samples of mainly illit-
erate poor farmers in the developing world. Interestingly, violation rates in the latter
do not seem to exceed those in the former as one may have expected.
Table 3.3: Violation rates with expected utility theory and stochastic dominance
n %
Violation of expected utility theory 147 40.27
Violation of transparent stochastic dominance 26 7.10
Violation of non-transparent stochastic dominance 202 55.34
Table 3.4 contains the results of the Holt-Laury elicitation of risk attitudes. 326 out
of 366 subjects (89%) played consistently and switched only once from the safe to the
risky option. This makes us confident that the majority of subjects fully understood
the rules of the game, which reinforces our conclusion from the transparent dominance
game.
Most subjects switched from the risky to the safe option after at least five safe
choices. They are hence generally risk averse. 15.7% of the sample exhibit less than
three safe choices and are thus highly risk loving. 39.45% are risk neutral or risk loving.
Compared to the initial study byHolt and Laury, 2002, the degree of risk aversion
observed in our sample is relatively low. For high real incentives, Holt and Laury
observed altogether only 2% of highly risk loving subjects, 19% of risk neutral or risk
loving subjects and a median number of safe choices of six.
The share of nearly 39.45% of risk neutral or risk loving subjects seems also high
compared to other studies in developing countries (e.g. Hardeweg et al., 2011) and
in particular to the study by Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009, which as our study elicits
risk aversion in rural Ethiopia. However, as pointed out by Vieider et al., 2012, in a
study of risk attitudes in 30 countries including Ethiopia, risk-seeking behavior seems
to be more frequent than supposed so far.
Observing several choices on the same subject pool allows to compute correlations
between them. Table 3.5 shows pairwise correlations between the violation of expected
1This is a conservative test. If subjects actually satisfy stochastic dominance, the hypothesis that
the individual probability of violating stochastic dominance due to mistakes, boredom or lack of
motivation equals 0.5 marks the limit (Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998).
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Table 3.4: Distribution of elicited risk attitudes
Number of n % Range of coefficient of
safe choices relative risk aversion
0-1 25 7.67 β < 2.05
2 26 7.98 2.05 < β < 1.55
3 35 10.74 1.55 < β < 1.18
4 42 12.88 1.18 < β < 0.86
5 81 24.85 0.86 < β < 0.57
6 60 18.40 0.57 < β < 0.28
7 36 11.04 0.28 < β < -0.05
8 19 5.83 -0.05 < β < -0.5
9-10 2 0.61 -0.5 < β
326 100
utility theory and stochastic dominance and the degree of risk aversion. Apparently,
the experimental outcomes are rather unrelated. With the exception of a slightly pos-
itive correlation between the degree of risk aversion and violation of non-transparent
stochastic dominance significant at the 10 % level, none of the correlation coefficients
is significant at conventional levels. These results suggests that violation of the rather
widely accepted stochastic dominance principle is unrelated to violation of the con-
troversial independence axiom. Furthermore, observed violations do not seem to be
driven by the risk attitude of the subjects.
The latter point is particularly interesting because, as pointed out by Harrison
et al., 2003, expected utility theory cannot be reliably tested without controlling for the
risk attitude of the subject. This is because the certainty equivalent of a lottery and the
difference in certainty equivalents of lottery pairs vary with the degree of risk aversion
of a subject. Consequently, the incentive to reveal the actually preferred lottery in a
choice problem is not the same for all subjects. With reference to several well-known
tests of expected utility theory, Harrison et al., 2003, demonstrate that for plausible
levels of risk aversion the difference in certainty equivalents in offered lotteries may
collapse to zero. Thus, subjects may be nearly indifferent between lotteries which
limits the potential to test the validity of a theory based on observed choices.
Table 3.5: Pairwise correlations
Violation of Risk
EUT transp. SD non-transp. SD aversion
Violation of EUT 1
Violation of transp. SD 0.077 1
Violation of non-transp. SD -0.013 -0.073 1
Risk aversion -0.039 0.013 0.100* 1
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3.3.2 Econometric analysis
We now consider how choices under risk vary with sociodemographic characteristics of
the subjects. We are particularly interested in the role of the educational background
for violations of expected utility and stochastic dominance.
Using a probit model, we regress a binary variable indicating violation of expected
utility theory and, respectively, stochastic dominance on measures of the educational
background of the subject:
violationi = α + β educationi +X ′i δ + ui
where educationi is a variable capturing the educational background of individual i,
Xi a vector of control variables and ui an error term. If more educated subjects have
lower violation rates, we expect β to be negative.
We consider three measures of the educational background of the individual. First,
we use the highest educational level attained by the subject with the categories 1) no
formal education, 2) some or completed primary education and 3) more than primary
education. Second, we use a dummy variable that equals one if the subject is able to
write. Third, we use a dummy variable that equals one if the subject is able to solve
simple math problems, which is assessed based on the correct answer to the following
question: “Suppose you want to buy bottles of softdrink in a shop. The shop sells a
bottle of softdrink for 4 Birr. How many bottles can you buy if you have 20 Birr?”
Descriptions and summary statistics of all variables used in the regressions, are given
in Tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix.
Regression results are shown in Table 3.6 which reports marginal effects. Depen-
dent variables are binary variables indicating violations of expected utility (columns
1-3), transparent stochastic dominance (columns 4-6) and non-transparent stochastic
dominance (columns 7-9). For each dependent variable, model 1 includes the highest
educational level attained, model 2 the ability to write and model 3 the ability to
calculate as measures of education.
As displayed in columns 1-3, we find support for the hypothesis that education is
linked with violation of expected utility theory. This holds for the formal education
variable and the writing ability, while the mathematical ability seems to be unrelated.
Interestingly, more educated subjects actually have larger probabilities of violating
expected utility theory. More precisely, a subject with some or completed primary
education and otherwise average characteristics has a probability of violating expected
utility theory that is 57.6 percentage points larger compared to a subject without
formal education. Similarly, the predicted probability of violating expected utility
theory is 50.7 percentage points larger for a literate subject compared to his illiterate
counterpart. This finding contradicts the result by Huck and Müller, 2012 who,
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depending on the treatment, find either no role of education or a negative effect of
education on violating expected utility theory.
In line with Huck and Müller, 2012, we do not observe any age effects. Con-
trolling for other characteristics, personality traits like trustfulness, optimism and risk
aversion have no significant influence on the probability of violating expected utility
theory. As in Huck andMüller, 2012, the household income category is not statisti-
cally significantly related with the violation probability. Among the variables capturing
household wealth, i.e. size of land holdings, ownership of radio or mattress, only the
latter has a statistically significant positive influence.
Considering violation of stochastic dominance in columns 4-9, we first observe that
the educational background does not seem to play a role. This is somewhat surprising
given that related studies from the western world have found that the probability
of choosing stochastically dominated lotteries decreases with education (Birnbaum,
1999a). We consistently find that more optimistic subjects have a larger probability of
violating stochastic dominance. For the case of transparent dominance, this also holds
for trusting compared to more skeptical subjects and subjects with a household income
from the second compared to the first tercile. Again, the age of the subject does not
matter and so does household wealth. For non-transparent stochastic dominance, we
observe a significantly negative influence of the household size and asset ownership.
In sum, the power of sociodemophraphic characteristics in explaining experimental
choices is rather limited in our sample. More educated subjects tend to violate expected
utility theory more frequently, while we do not observe a relationship between education
and stochastic dominance. Throughout, we do not find significant effects of individual
risk attitudes on experimental choices. In line with Harrison et al., 2003, we thus
conclude that violations of the properties under consideration are not driven by low or
zero opportunity costs of making decision errors for risk averse individuals. However,
our results suggest that other psychological traits of decision-makers such as their
trustfulness or optimism are revelant for explaining choices under risk.
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper focuses on risk preferences of Ethiopian farmers. We combine an experimen-
tal study on choice under risk with a survey capturing sociodemographic characteristics
of the subjects. The monetarily incentivized experiments include tests of violation of
the independence axiom of expected utility theory, transparent and non-transparent
stochastic dominance as well as an elicitation of risk attitudes in the tradition of Holt
and Laury, 2002.
Two main findings emerge from the present study. First, poor subjects from devel-
oping countries seem to behave similarly to (student) subjects from the western world
in experimental risky choice situations. Violation rates of expected utility theory in
the common ratio problem and rates of selecting stochastically dominated lotteries are
comparable to those observed in samples from developed countries.
Second, more educated subjects tend to violate expected utility theory more fre-
quently, whereas we do not observe any relationship with violating the principle of
stochastic dominance. We do not observe any consistent pattern regarding the influ-
ence of age, income or wealth of the respondent. Sociodemographic characteristics of
the subjects thus explain experimental choices only to a limited extent. Our findings
suggest, however, that psychological traits of the decision maker like his trustfulness
or optimism play an important role.
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Chapter 4
Overconfidence, Performance and
Happiness1
4.1 Introduction
Many people hold biased beliefs about their own abilities and personal attributes. This
bias is typically upward, a phenomenon called overconfidence. The literature is rich
in empirical studies of different facets of overconfidence. For instance, individuals are
found to overestimate their management skills (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008),
their reading comprehension (Maki et al., 2005) or their performance in a college
debate tournament (Ehrlinger et al., 2008). In comparison with their peers, individ-
uals tend to overrank themselves resulting in the well-known better-than-average-effect.
E.g., Svenson, 1981 reports that 93% of individuals rate their driving skills as above
the median. People also underestimate the probability of adverse events such as hospi-
talization (Weinstein, 1980). Investors overestimate the precision of their knowledge
about specific companies (Odean, 1998, 1999). Likewise, confidence intervals elicited
in almanac questions like the year of the first flight of the hot air balloon or the length
of the Nile River are typically too narrow (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992, Soll and
Klayman, 2004), expressing excessive certainty in own beliefs, also called miscalibra-
tion.
Psychologists and economists have extensively disputed the benefits and costs of
overconfidence. Advocates of overconfidence stress the benefits through increased mo-
tivation, aspiration levels and coping ability in the face of negative feedback (Benabou
and Tirole, 2002). They relate positive illusions to better mental health, intellectual
functioning and interpersonal relationships (Taylor and Brown, 1988, Taylor et
al., 2003, Felson, 1984, Isen and Daubman, 1984, Isen and Means, 1983, Bohrn-
stedt and Felson, 1983). According to the critics, however, overconfidence is costly
1This chapter is a slightly modified version of the working paper “Overconfidence, Performance and
Happiness” jointly written with Toman Omar Mahmoud and Ulrich Schmidt.
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as it results in maladjustment and relational problems (Colvin et al., 1995), disengage-
ment (Robins and Beer, 2001), poorer social skills and lower academic competence
(Gresham et al., 2000, Kwan et al., 2008). Overconfidence can cause the pursuit
of unreasonable goals (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), excessive risk-taking and
trading volumes (Odean, 1998, 1999) and excessive business entry (Camerer and
Lovallo, 1999).
We contribute to the literature on overconfidence by developing and empirically
applying an integrated framework to study the objective and subjective costs of over-
confidence during preparation for a future task. We develop a utility-based model
to formally derive the effect of overconfidence with regard to existing knowledge dur-
ing a learning process on final performance and subjective well-being. We show that
the erroneous feeling of already mastering a task induces an underestimation of the
marginal productivity of subsequent effort. As a result, overconfidence leads to a less
than optimal choice of effort and, in turn, to inefficiently low performance. Overconfi-
dence directly lowers utility through inefficient time allocation. In addition, overcon-
fidence inflates performance expectations which contributes to a further loss of utility
by widening the gap between expected and actual performance. In sum, we argue that
overconfidence is associated with twofold costs as it reduces both objective performance
and subjective well-being. The performance loss stems from inefficiently low effort due
to an overly positive assessment of existing knowledge. The loss of subjective well-being
is a consequence of the performance loss combined with the expectation-inflating effect
of overconfidence.
We test these predictions in a natural learning environment of undergraduate stu-
dents of economics. We measure the overconfidence bias as the number of correctly
answered questions in a multiple choice test on the material of an introductory eco-
nomics course. After completing the test, students were requested to “postdict” their
score, i.e. to estimate the number of questions they believed they answered correctly.
We define overconfidence as the relative overestimation of the test score, and test for
its explanatory power with regard to the final exam score, expected final exam score,
and satisfaction with the final exam grade. Consistent with our theoretical predictions,
overconfidence is associated with lower exam scores, higher expected exam scores and
lower levels of satisfaction.
While evidently important in the setting under consideration, our model is appli-
cable to any process in which investment contributes to the accumulation of a not
directly measurable (immaterial) asset required in the future to fulfill a task or reach
a goal. Besides learning processes in which effort is invested to accumulate knowledge,
other examples include career development, the decision to marry, health behavior,
and accumulation of evidence in court.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the psycho-
logical literature and builds the theoretical model. Section 4.3 describes the empirical
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setting and data. Section 4.4 summarizes the descriptive analysis and regression results.
Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Why overconfidence might be costly in terms
of performance and happiness
4.2.1 Psychological background
Overconfidence affects performance through a change in behavior. In the setting to be
studied, we consider the effect of overconfidence on knowledge accumulation through a
change in learning behavior. Based on the theory of metacognition, we argue that over-
confidence reduces the amount of effort spent during the learning period, resulting in
less accumulated knowledge. Less knowledge is not only disadvantageous in itself, but
also reduces the subjective well-being of the overconfident individual when knowledge
is retrieved.
Metacognition can be defined as “knowing about knowing” or “cognition about
cognition” (Metcalfe and Shimamura, 1994). The term has been introduced by
Flavell who described metacognition as “one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cog-
nitive processes and products or anything related to them” (Flavell, 1976, p. 232).
An influential metacognitive theory has been formulated by Nelson and Narens,
1990. Their seminal model of procedural metacognition integrates the large number
of studies on metacognition by experimental and educational psychology research that
followed Flavell, 1976, and it still represents the scientific base for today’s research.
Nelson and Narens, 1990, divide cognitive processes into two interrelated levels,
the meta level and the object level. The meta level monitors the object level using
information about the knowledge status at the object level and controls learning pro-
cesses at the object level. E.g., as a learner studies, she monitors how well she masters
the learning material. The information obtained from monitoring will then be used to
control subsequent learning, i.e. to decide whether to terminate or continue learning
(Thiede, 1999).
Metacognition has also been studied from a neurocognitive perspective. Neuro-
scientists link the functioning of metacognitive processes to activity of the human
brain. As suggested by dynamic filtering theory, the neural description of Nelson
and Narens’s model, the interaction of the prefrontal cortex with other cortical re-
gions through feedback loops is responsible for metacognitive monitoring and control
processes (Shimamura, 1996, 2000, Fleming and Dolan, 2012).
One implication of Nelson and Narens’s, 1990, theory is that a poor monitoring
ability adversely affects the overall level of learning achievement. Given a limited time
budget, knowing what one does and does not know establishes the basis for efficiently
choosing between alternative learning strategies and effort expenditures. It allows
avoiding premature termination and prolonged duration of learning and narrowing
the focus of learning to deficient areas of knowledge (Hacker et al., 2000). Thus,
individuals who are able to accurately monitor themselves should learn more efficiently
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than their over- or underconfident counterparts, i.e. accomplish more tasks in the same
time or the same number of tasks in shorter time.
As regards achievement on a single task, the theory implies that overconfidence with
respect to this monitoring task hampers performance as a result of exerting too little
effort. If the information obtained from monitoring erroneously points to a sufficient
mastery of the subject matter, the study phase will be terminated inefficiently early.
Conversely, underconfidence should induce “overlearning” and thus better achievement
on this task compared to accurate and, even more, overconfident students.
A learning process results in performance (e.g., an exam grade) as an objective
outcome. Performance in turn has affective consequences for the individual which are
relevant for future motivation, study habits and dedication to a subject in general
(Grimes, 2002). How a person feels about an outcome is not simply a function of the
outcome itself, but depends on the standard the person uses for rating success and fail-
ure. Emotional experiences are generally enhanced by surprises, so the same outcome
can feel very pleasant or very unpleasant depending on the standard. Surprising wins
are more elating than expected wins while surprising losses are more disappointing
than expected losses (Carver and Scheier, 1990, Carver, 2003, Mellers et al.,
1997).
In economics, the most famous theory incorporating this idea is Kahneman and
Tversky’s, 1979, Prospect Theory. It posits that an outcome is evaluated relative
to a reference point, usually considered as the status quo. More recently, Kőszegi
and Rabin, 2006, developed a model of reference dependent preferences where the
reference point is formed by the expectations of the decision maker. The aspiration’s
theory of happiness states that individual happiness positively depends on achievement
and negatively on the personal aspiration level. The aspiration level can be defined as
the smallest outcome deemed satisfactory by the decision maker (Schneider, 1992).
Consistently withKőszegi andRabin, 2006, expectations about future outcomes have
been identified as one important determinant of the aspiration level.2 Consequently,
low expectations tend to offer emotional benefits as they raise joy following success
(affective amplification) and reduce pain following failure (affective attenuation).
2See e.g. Easterlin, 2001, and Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b, for reviews of the theory of
happiness and McBride, 2010, for a discussion of the formation of aspirations. For an early model
incorporating the role of expectations for disappointment and elation in evaluating outcomes see
Bell, 1985.
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4.2.2 Model
We formalize the relationship between metacognitive monitoring accuracy, objective
performance and subjective well-being in a utility-based model. Optimal effort spend-
ing is derived for an individual who maximizes her utility depending on expected future
task performance and leisure consumption. We theoretically show that optimal effort
spending decreases with the overestimation of the existing knowledge level. Compared
to unbiased self-monitoring, overconfidence implies a reduction of objective perfor-
mance and final subjective well-being. The loss of subjective well-being results from
inefficiently low performance together with inflated performance expectations which
simultaneously contribute to a widening gap between expectations and reality.
Our model divides the whole learning period into two phases, the pre-monitoring
learning phase and the post-monitoring learning phase. The pre-monitoring learning
phase starts at time t = 0 and ends at the monitoring time t = t˜ when the knowl-
edge accumulated so far is evaluated. Information gained from monitoring is used to
optimize effort spending in the post-monitoring learning phase which ends with final
performance at time t = T (see Figure 4.1). In the following, we consider utility-
maximizing behavior at an arbitrary monitoring time t = t˜ which may be repeated
infinitely often at different times t during the whole learning period.
Figure 4.1: Phases of the learning period
tt ~=0=t Tt =
Period 1:
Pre-monitoring
learning phase
Period 2:
Post-monitoring
learning phase
Utility in t = t˜ positively depends on expected future performance Et˜[pT ] and l2,
leisure consumed in the post-monitoring learning phase:
Ut˜ = Ut˜(Et˜[pT ], l2) (4.1)
with ∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pT ]
> 0, ∂
2Ut˜
∂Et˜[pT ]2
< 0, ∂Ut˜
∂l2
> 0, ∂
2Ut˜
∂l22
< 0.
Expected performance is defined as the sum of the current subjective knowledge level
Kst˜ and the expected knowledge gain after monitoring ∆Kst˜ . Kst˜ positively depends on
effort spent so far in the pre-monitoring learning phase e1 and ability a. ∆Kst˜ decreases
with the subjective existing knowledge Kst˜ , and increases with planned future effort in
the post-monitoring learning phase e2 and ability a (see (4.2)).
We explicitly specify one possible overconfidence bias in the model. In particular,
we consider the bias in assessing the current knowledge level. We define γ as the
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extent to which the learner overestimates her existing knowledge level Kt˜ at t = t˜, i.e.
Kst˜ = (1 + γ)Kt˜. γ is positive if the learner overestimates her existing knowledge level
and negative if the learner underestimates her current knowledge level (see (4.3)).
Et˜[pT ] = Kst˜ (e1, a) + ∆Kst˜ (Kst˜ , e2, a) (4.2)
= (1 + γ)Kt˜(e1, a) + ∆Kst˜ ((1 + γ)Kt˜, e2, a) (4.3)
where γ ≥ −1 and ∂∆Kst˜
∂e2
> 0, ∂
2∆Ks
t˜
∂e22
< 0 and ∂
2∆Ks
t˜
∂e2∂Kt˜
< 0.
Finally, (4.4) is a time constraint stating that the sum of effort e2 and leisure l2 spent
in the post-monitoring learning phase must equal the total time budget:
e2 + l2 = 1. (4.4)
Maximizing (4.1) with respect to e2 and l2 subject to (4.2) and (4.4) yields the first-
order conditions:
∂L
∂e2
= ∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂e2
+ λ = 0 (4.5)
∂L
∂l2
= ∂Ut˜
∂l2
+ λ = 0 (4.6)
which lead to the optimality condition
∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂e2
= ∂Ut˜
∂l2
. (4.7)
According to (4.7), the expected marginal utility of effort equals the marginal utility
of leisure in the optimum.
Plausibly, the expected marginal productivity of effort is positive
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂e2
= ∂∆K
s
t˜ ((1 + γ)Kt˜, e2, a)
∂e2
> 0, (4.8)
and can be shown to decrease with the bias γ
∂2Et˜[pT ]
∂e2∂γ
= ∂
2∆Kst˜ ((1 + γ)Kt˜, e2, a)
∂e2∂Kt˜
Kt˜ < 0. (4.9)
Thus, an increase in the bias γ reduces the expected marginal productivity of effort in
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the post-monitoring learning phase and therefore leads to more time spent on leisure
and less time spent on effort in the optimal allocation (see Figure 4.2). The more
the individual believes she knows already, the less effort she is willing to spend as the
expected knowledge gains through effort spending diminish.
Figure 4.2: Change of optimal time allocation as the overconfidence bias increases
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∂Ut/∂l2
∂Ut/∂e2
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As the marginal productivity of effort is positive, lower effort-spending entails lower
performance:
pT = Kt˜(e1, a) + ∆Kt˜(Kt˜, e2, a) (4.10)
∂pT
∂γ
= ∂∆Kt˜
∂e2
∂e2
∂γ
< 0. (4.11)
So far, we have shown that overconfidence with regard to one’s knowledge level during
a learning process lowers objective performance. We now address the implications of
overconfidence for ex-post subjective well-being. In accordance with the aspirations
theory of happiness and related psychological theories, we supplement the ex-ante
utility function with the gap between expected and actual performance and specify
ex-post utility as
UT = UT (pT , l2, Et˜[pT ]− pT ) (4.12)
where ∂UT
∂pT
> 0, ∂UT
∂l2
> 0, ∂UT
∂(Et˜[pT ])−pT < 0. Thus, in addition to the positive marginal
utilities of performance and leisure, we assume a negative marginal utility of worse
than expected performance. Under this ex-post utility function and the same time
constraint, the first order conditions modify to
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∂L
∂e2
= ∂UT
∂pT
∂pT
∂e2
+ ∂UT
∂(Et˜[pT ]− pT )
∂(Et˜[pT ]− pT )
∂e2
+ λ = 0 (4.13)
∂L
∂l2
= ∂UT
∂l2
+ λ = 0 (4.14)
which leads to the ex-post optimality condition
∂UT
∂pT
∂pT
∂e2
+ ∂UT
∂(Et˜[pT ]− pT )
∂(Et˜[pT ]− pT )
∂e2
= ∂UT
∂l2
. (4.15)
At the end of the learning process, when their actual performance is known, biased
indiviuals become aware of their initially biased self-assessment. The ex-post efficient
optimum is therefore characterized by the optimality condition of an unbiased individ-
ual which reduces to
∂UT
∂pT
∂pT
∂e2
= ∂UT
∂l2
. (4.16)
In the ex-post efficient optimum, the marginal utility of leisure equals the true marginal
utility of effort. Ex post, an overconfident individual realizes that she underestimated
the marginal utility of effort ex ante. Had she been aware of her overconfidence, she
would have spent more effort. Therefore, the time allocation that was made under
biased self-assessment yields less ex-post utility than the allocation that would have
been made under unbiased self-assessment. In addition to the utility loss resulting from
the inefficient time allocation, an overconfident individual loses even more utility due
to the negative surprise resulting from the widened gap between expected and actual
performance.
As shown above, ∂pT
∂γ
< 0; hence, overconfidence widens the gap between expected
and actual performance, Et˜[pT ]−pT , by lowering performance. This effect is reinforced
by the fact that overconfidence not only lowers performance, but also inflates perfor-
mance expectations. To see this, we derive the marginal impact of the overconfidence
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bias γ on expected performance3:
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂γ
= Kt˜ +
(
∂∆Kst˜
∂Ks
t˜
Kt˜ +
∂∆Kst˜
∂e2
∂e2
∂γ
)
(4.17)
=
(
1 + ∂∆K
s
t˜
∂Ks
t˜
+ ∂∆K
s
t˜
∂e2
∂e2
∂(1 + γ)Kt˜
)
Kt˜ (4.18)
The term in parentheses in (4.18) equals the change in expected performance with
respect to a marginal increase in the current subjective knowledge level:
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂(1 + γ)Kt˜
= 1 + ∂∆K
s
t˜
∂Ks
t˜
+ ∂∆K
s
t˜
∂e2
∂e2
∂(1 + γ)Kt˜
> 0 (4.19)
which we assume to be positive. We thus assume that an increase in subjective know-
ledge Kst˜ does not crowd out optimal effort so much that the optimal subjective know-
ledge in T , E[pT ], decreases, i.e.
∂∆Ks
t˜
∂Ks
t˜
> −1. In other words, for identical utility
and ∆Kst˜ functions, a person who believes to know more in t = t˜ does also believe
to know more in t = T . Under this assumption, (4.18) is clearly positive and the
expectation-performance gap widens as a result of overconfidence.
In sum, overconfidence leads to inefficient time allocation. An overconfident indivi-
dual invests less than optimal time in effort in the post-monitoring learning phase. As
a consequence, overconfidence is associated with lower than optimal performance. At
the same time, overconfidence inflates performance expectations. Both, the resulting
expectation-performance gap and the inefficiently low performance decrease ex-post
utility compared to an individual with unbiased self-monitoring.
For underconfidence, the effects on ex-post utility are ambiguous within this frame-
work. On the one hand, the time allocation that was made ex ante turns out to be
inefficient ex post as it does for overconfidence. Underconfident individuals spend in-
efficiently high effort and consume inefficiently low leisure. Again, the inefficiency of
the chosen allocation decreases ex-post utility. On the other hand, and in contrast to
overconfidence, underconfidence is associated with a positive surprise effect. The net
effect of underconfidence on ex-post utility is therefore ambiguous. In the appendix,
we show in an extended model with multiple tasks that underconfidence with regard
to one task does not only lead to inefficiently low consumption of leisure, but also to
3The equality of (4.17) and (4.18) can be easily shown:
∂Et˜[pT ]
∂γ
= Kt˜ +
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∂∆Ks
t˜
∂Ks
t˜
Kt˜ +
∂∆Ks
t˜
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∂e2
∂γ
)
=
(
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t˜
∂Ks
t˜
)
Kt˜ +
∂∆Ks
t˜
∂e2
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=
(
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t˜
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1
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inefficiently low spending of effort on other tasks. Thus, underconfidence comes at the
cost of lower overall achievement, which, however, is not considered here.
Based on the model predictions, we put forward the following hypotheses to be
tested empirically:
1. Overconfidence lowers actual performance (see (4.11)).
2. Overconfidence inflates expected performance (see (4.18)).
3. Low performance and worse than expected performance reduce ex-post utility
(see (4.12)).
While our model explicitly considers the bias in assessing the existing knowledge
level at t = t˜, it can easily be extended to integrate a bias in assessing effort productivity
in the post-monitoring learning phase. The implications of this type of overconfidence
would be the same. An individual who overestimates future knowledge gains would
invest less than optimal time in effort, thus lowering her performance and inflating her
performance expectations. As before, inefficiently low performance and the widened
gap between actual and expected performance would decrease ex-post utility.
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4.3 Setting and data
We empirically apply the model to a real world scenario. In the scenario under consid-
eration, university students prepare for an exam which takes place at time t = T . At
one point in time before the exam t = t˜, we make the existing knowledge level observ-
able by conducting a multiple choice test on the exam-relevant topics and determining
individual test scores. Additionally, at t = t˜ we ask students to estimate their existing
knowledge level and inquire expectations about the future exam score and grade.
The main advantage of the selected scenario is that it perfectly mirrors the course
of the learning process modeled in the theoretical framework. In particular, it allows
us to objectively measure performance as well as existing exam-relevant knowledge.
Another important feature is that participants have an inherent motivation to acquire
and retrieve the tested fields of knowledge.
We visited ten tutorial groups to the lecture “Introduction to Economics” held at the
University of Kiel in the winter term 2011/2012 in their penultimate session before the
exam. In total, 108 students who took the regular exam two weeks later participated
in the study. The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part contained ten
multiple choice questions on various topics taught within the course. Three answer
options were provided for each question among which only one option was correct. The
style of the questions was comparable to the multiple choice section of the final exam.
The second part then inquired about a student’s self-evaluation of her own performance
in the previous multiple choice test and about her expectations for the future exam.
Specifically, students were asked to estimate the number of correct answers in the
multiplce choice test (0-10) as well as the score and grade they would obtain in the
final exam. Possible exam scores ranged from 0 to 120 and were transformed into
grades from 0 (failed) to 10 (excellent) in steps of one. In addition, the second part
collected information on each student’s sex, field of study and final high school grade
(“Abiturnote”). The second part of the questionnaire was distributed after the first
part had been completed and collected. Completing the whole questionnaire took
about 15 to 20 minutes (8-13 minutes for the first part plus 5-7 minutes for the second
part). After exam results were published, we elicited students’ individual happiness
with their result on a scale from very unhappy (1) to very happy (10) by email.
We operationalize the concept of overconfidence by comparing the score an indi-
vidual i estimates she has achieved in the multiple choice test, mcsi , and the score she
actually achieved, mci. The actual score is intended to reflect the knowledge level at
t = t˜ whereas the estimated score represents its subjective counterpart.
Consistent with the theoretical formulation in (4.3), we define overconfidence as the
relative overestimation of the true score:
overconfidencei = (mcsi/mci)− 1. (4.20)
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The more the estimated score exceeds the actual score, the more pronounced is over-
confidence. Negative overconfidence implies underconfidence with regard to current
knowledge.
To address concerns that observed biases may not reflect genuinely biased beliefs,
but result from insufficient mental effort or a motivation to self-enhance, we monetarily
incentivize accuracy of estimates in a treatment group. Monetary incentives have been
shown to reduce self-presentational concerns and increase effort to answer questions
correctly (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Thus, providing incentives for accurate
estimates should reduce the controllable part of observed overconfidence and yield
insights into the incidence of its behaviorally relevant part (Ehrlinger et al., 2008).
Subjects in the treatment group earned five Euros for each correct performance
estimate (multiple choice test score, exam score (± 3) and exam grade). The maximum
payout in the treatment group amounted to fifteen Euros. Average payout was 4.10
Euros. To prevent strategic behavior by leaving questions in the multiple choice test
unanswered, participants were not informed about the content of the second part of
the questionnaire before they had completed the first part. The control group received
a flat payment of five Euros for full completion of the questionnaire. Relative to the
time it took to complete the questionnaire, the financial compensation was highly
rewarding. Only five participants refused to stay for the survey, mostly because they
had appointments right after the tutorial session.
To test whether monetary incentives can reduce observed biases, we regress ob-
served biases and their absolute values on a monetary treatment dummy. As shown
in Table C.3 in the appendix, monetary incentives are not significantly related to the
accuracy of performance estimates or observed overconfidence. It therefore seems that
subjects were truly unable to correctly postdict their test score. This result is in line
with the few other studies considering incentives and overconfidence (Hacker et al.,
2008, Yates et al., 1997, Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005, Ehrlinger et al., 2008,
and Clark and Friesen, 2009). It seems that the quality of monitoring is largely not
controllable by the learner. This result speaks in favor of a cognitive rather than a mo-
tivational explanation for overconfidence. Therefore, a relationship between observed
overconfidence and the functioning of cognitive processes is likely.
Other important variables in the theoretical model are performance, performance
expectations and ability. We measure performance by the percentage score individual
i obtains in the exam, i.e. performancei = (exami/120)× 100. Correspondingly, the
expected performance is defined as the percentage exam score that individual i expects
to obtain in the exam, i.e. E[performance]i = (examsi/120) × 100. As a proxy for
cognitive ability, we refer to the high school grade. The high school grade is a weighted
average of grades obtained during the last two years in high school and ranges from
failed (0) to excellent (10). School achievement has been shown to be closely linked
to general mental ability. Correlations between measures of school achievement and
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general mental ability are typically around .5 which makes general mental ability the
best known predictor of school success (Gustafsson and Undheim, 1996, Spinath
et al., 2006).
Finally, happiness or satisfaction with the obtained grade is defined on a ten point
scale ranging from very unhappy (1) to very happy (10). When estimating the impact
of performance and the expectation-performance gap on happiness, we consider grades
instead of raw scores because they are more relevant to the student than the underlying
scores. Actually obtained and expected grades range from failed (0) to excellent (10).
The expectation-performance gap is calculated as the difference between the expected
and the actual grade.
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4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis
Subjects are fairly inaccurate in estimating their performance in the multiple choice
test. Estimates deviate from the true values by an average of 35%. The bias is upward
with an average overestimation of 22%. Thus, the sample as a whole is character-
ized by overconfidence. Both the overconfidence bias as well as as its absolute value
are significantly different from zero. Hidden in these aggregate figures is considerable
heterogeneity between subjects. Slightly more than 50% of the sample is overconfi-
dent. About 20% correctly estimate their score. And a non-negligible share of 30% is
underconfident.
We now consider the univariate relationship between overconfidence, and perfor-
mance and expected performance in the final exam. Figure 4.3 provides the kernel
density estimates of the (expected) exam performance for over-, under- and normal-
confident students. Consistent with our hypothesis, these unconditional plots suggest
that overconfident students perform worse than underconfident students. On average,
overconfident students achieved about 57% of the maximum score whereas the score
distribution of the underconfident is shifted to the right with an average score of about
63%. In contrast, overconfident students expect an average of 73% of the maximum
score whereas the underconfident only expect about 70%.
The scatter plots in Figure 4.4 confirm the impression of a negative correlation bet-
ween overconfidence and performance and a slight positive correlation between overcon-
fidence and expectations. The graphs clearly show that increasing confidence during
the learning stage is associated with poorer performance and higher performance ex-
pectations.
Finally, the scatter plots in Figure 4.5 visualize the relationship between perfor-
mance, the expectation-performance gap and happiness. The upper panel shows that
better grades are associated with higher levels of happiness. The lower panel shows
that pleasant surprises, i.e. negative expectation-performance gaps, are associated with
higher happiness levels than unpleasant surprises.
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Figure 4.3: Kernel densities by type of bias
(a) Exam score
(b) Expected exam score
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Figure 4.4: Overconfidence bias and (expected) percentage exam score, linear fit
(a) Exam score
(b) Expected exam score
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Figure 4.5: Performance, expectations, happiness
(a) Grade
(b) Expected grade-grade
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4.4.2 Econometric analysis
The descriptive analysis offers support for the predictions of the theoretical model.
To control for potentially important dimensions of heterogeneity between individuals,
however, we also conduct an econometric analysis of the relationship between overcon-
fidence, (expected) performance and happiness.
Overconfidence and performance
We first test the hypothesis that overconfidence lowers performance. Using ordinary
least squares, we regress performance as measured by the percentage score obtained in
the exam on overconfidence:
performancei = α + β overconfidencei +X ′i δ + ui
where overconfidencei is the degree of overconfidence of individual i, Xi a vector of
control variables and ui an error term. If overconfidence lowers performance, we expect
β to be negative.
Table 4.1 summarizes the results. In column 1, we start with the most parsimonious
specification. Following the theoretical model, exam performance is a function of ability
as proxied by high school grade, and of the degree of overconfidence as the prime
determinant of effort spent on learning. We find clear support for the hypothesis that
overconfidence lowers performance. A ten percentage point increase in the degree of
overconfidence is associated with a 0.73 percentage point reduction in the exam score.
Accordingly, a standard deviation increase in the degree of overconfidence (0.57) is
associated with a more than four percentage point reduction in the exam score. As
expected, individuals with better high school grades also perform better in the exam.
We check the robustness of this result by gradually expanding the set of control
variables. Column 2 adds a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was
provided monetary incentives to estimate her performance in the multiple choice test
more accurately. The coefficient of overconfidence, however, remains the same. This
result is in line with the previous finding that monetary incentives did not make an
individual more accurate in estimating her performance in the multiple choice test
(Table C.3 in the appendix).
Column 3 considers the possibility that overconfident individuals may have different
aspiration levels and additionally controls for the exam grade at which an individual
would have been satisfied with her performance. While higher aspirations go along
with higher exam scores, they do not affect the estimated relationship between over-
confidence and performance.
Column 4 controls for individual heterogeneity in terms of field of study (economics
versus other fields of studies) and sex (male versus female). It also adds a full set of
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tutor dummies to take into account that the tutorials accompanying the lecture were
held by four different tutors. None of these variables is significantly related with exam
performance and the coefficient of overconfidence is fully robust to their inclusion.
Overall, the results presented in Table 4.1 strongly support the hypothesis that
overconfidence lowers performance. While we cannot exclude the possibility that our
results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity, the stability of the coefficient of over-
confidence across the different specifications suggests little role for an unobserved con-
founder. To fully explain away the estimated relationship between overconfidence and
performance, an unobserved confounder must be much more strongly associated with
overconfidence and performance than our set of control variables which already capture
many important dimensions of heterogeneity.
Table 4.1: Regression results for the exam performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Overconfidence -7.3*** -7.3*** -6.9*** -6.2***
(1.9) (1.9) (1.8) (1.9)
High school grade 3.2*** 3.2*** 3.0*** 3.0***
(0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7)
Monetary incentives 1.0 1.4
(2.4) (2.3)
Satisfactory grade 1.9*** 1.9***
(0.6) (0.7)
Economics student -3.6
(2.8)
Male 3.6
(2.5)
Tutor 2 -1.3
(3.6)
Tutor 3 1.2
(3.5)
Tutor 4 -3.4
(3.2)
Constant 43.2*** 43*** 33.5*** 33.9***
(4.4) (4.4) (5.7) (6.4)
R squared 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.36
N 108 108 108 108
Results of OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the percent-
age exam score. ***/**/* denote significance at a 1/5/10 per
cent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Overconfidence and performance expectations
We next test the hypothesis that overconfidence inflates expected performance by re-
gressing expected performance as measured by the expected percentage score obtained
in the exam on overconfidence:
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E[performance]i = φ+ λ overconfidencei + Y ′i µ+ vi
where Yi is a vector of control variables and vi an error term. If overconfidence inflates
expected performance, we expect λ to be positive.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results. Again, column 1 starts with a parsimonious
specification that closely builds on the theoretical model. In addition to ability, we
also include an individual’s existing knowledge level at the time the multiple choice
test was conducted and expectations were made (see (4.2)). We control for an indi-
vidual’s actual knowledge level rather than her subjective knowledge level, so that the
variable does not capture the effects of overconfidence. We find strong support for
the hypothesis that overconfidence increases expected performance. A ten percentage
point increase in the degree of overconfidence is associated with a 0.64 percentage point
increase in the expected exam score. Or, a standard deviation increase in the degree
of overconfidence (0.57) is associated with an increase in the expected exam score by
almost four percentage points. The estimated relationship between overconfidence and
expected performance is robust to adding controls for monetary incentives (column 2)
and field of study, sex and tutor (column 3).
Table 4.2: Regression results for the expected exam performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Overconfidence 6.4*** 6.0*** 5.0**
(1.9) (1.9) (1.9)
High school grade 0.6 0.5 1.0*
(0.5) (0.5) (0.6)
MC score 2.6*** 2.5*** 2.2***
(0.6) (0.7) (0.6)
Monetary incentives 2.6
(1.6)
Economics student 3.2*
(1.7)
Male 1.8
(1.8)
Tutor 2 -3.8*
(2.2)
Tutor 3 -1.0
(2.8)
Tutor 4 -4.3**
(2.1)
Constant 52.0*** 52.1*** 51.6***
(4.4) (4.4) (5.0)
R squared 0.16 0.18 0.23
N 108 108 108
Results of OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the
expected percentage exam score. ***/**/* denote
significance at a 1/5/10 per cent level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Performance, expectations and happiness
We have shown that overconfidence is strongly associated with lower levels of actual
performance and inflated levels of expected performance. As argued above, overcon-
fidence should therefore affect subjective well-being. We test the resulting hypothesis
that lower performance and a larger expectation-performance gap reduce grade hap-
piness or satisfaction with the obtained grade. The empirical specification takes the
following form:
happinessi = ρ+ σ gradei + τ (E[grade]− grade)i + Z ′i θ + wi
where Zi is a vector of control variables and wi an error term. If lower grades and
larger expectation-performance gaps reduce happiness, we expect σ to be positive and
τ to be negative.
As column 1 in Table 4.3 shows, this is indeed the case. Lower grades are associated
with significantly lower levels of happiness than higher grades. And bad surprises in the
form of worse than expected grades are negatively related with the level of happiness,
too. We also assess the direct relationship between overconfidence and happiness. If
overconfidence lowers actual performance and increases expected performance and both
in turn reduce happiness, overconfidence should also be directly associated with lower
levels of happiness. Indeed, as column 2 shows, overconfidence is significantly and
negatively associated with happiness.
The estimated coefficients of the main specification in column 1 do not change after
controlling for high school grade, field of study, sex and tutor (column 3). One may
be concerned that a considerable number of students did not respond to the email in
which we inquired about a student’s satisfaction with the grade (the number of obser-
vations drops to 89). If students who did not respond were particularly unhappy with
the grade, possibly as a result of overconfidence, systematic non-response may bias the
coefficients of interest. To address this potential attrition bias, we employ the method
of inverse probability weights. We predict the probability of responding to our email
by individual characteristics using a probit model for the complete sample of students.
These characteristics include the high school grade, the field of study, sex, and tutor
as well as the exam grade and the difference between the actual and expected grade.
As argued above, both the grade and the difference between the actual and the ex-
pected grade are prime determinants of grade satisfaction. They should therefore play
an important role in explaining response to our email. We then compute the inverse
probability of responding to our email for each student and use it as a weight for the
respective observation in our sub-sample of students who did respond to our happiness
question by email. Hence, students with a low estimated probability of response are at-
tached a higher weight and vice versa. As column 4 shows, the use of inverse probability
4.4 Empirical analysis 75
weights does not affect the estimated relationship between happiness, performance and
the expectation-performance gap. We are therefore confident that attrition bias does
not constitute a major problem in our analysis.
Table 4.3: Regression results for the happiness level
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Grade 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.5***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Estimated grade-grade -0.3** -0.4** -0.4***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Overconfidence -0.9*
(0.5)
High school grade 0.0 0.0
(0.1) (0.1)
Economics student 0.4 0.5
(0.4) (0.4)
Male -0.2 -0.3
(0.4) (0.4)
Tutor 2 -0.3 -0.3
(0.6) (0.6)
Tutor 3 0.1 0.1
(0.5) (0.5)
Tutor 4 0.4 0.5
(0.5) (0.5)
Constant 3.6*** 6.2*** 3.5*** 3.7***
(0.8) (0.3) (0.9) (0.9)
R squared 0.6 0 0.6 0.7
N 89 90 86 86
Results of OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the happiness
level ranging from 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy). ***/**/*
denote significance at a 1/5/10 per cent level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. In model 4, inverse probability
weights are used.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the costs of overconfidence during preparation for a future task.
We show theoretically and empirically that overly optimistic beliefs about one’s own
existing knowledge are detrimental for future objective task performance and subjective
well-being.
In accordance with metacognitive theory and models of self-regulated learning,
we attribute the performance-reducing effect of overconfidence to insufficient effort
spending. Thus, providing regular feedback may help individuals who think they know
more than they actually do to allocate their time more efficiently. It may also help
them to form more realistic performance expectations and avoid disappointment and
frustration. Ultimately, seeing oneself more often in an unbiased mirror may allow
overconfident individuals to obtain better objective and subjective outcomes.
It is important to note that our results apply to a single task and do not necessarily
generalize to overall achievement across different tasks. Obviously, if an individual
spends all her time on one particular task due to her underconfidence with regard to
this task, she might perform extraordinarily well in that task, but achieve nothing else.
Accordingly, underconfident individuals may forgo important opportunities in life. The
university students in our sample are a case in point. The sampled individuals have all
been sufficiently confident to enrol in a university, select the introductory economics
course and take the exam. By contrast, highly underconfident individuals may have
opted against trying to obtain a university degree even if they had the intellectual
ability to do so.
Therefore, making conclusions about the costs and benefits of overconfidence re-
quires a broader view. We share the view ofKahneman, 2011, that goals which people
set for themselves influence where they end up and how they feel about it. On the
one hand, setting ambitious goals pushes individuals towards coming close to them.
On the other hand, setting goals that are (too) difficult to achieve fuels dissatisfaction.
Similar to goal setting, finding the right balance between confidence and scepticism
about oneself seems promising for a successful and satisfying life.
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Chapter 5
Overconfidence and Risk Taking of
Ethiopian Farmers1
5.1 Introduction
Fluctuating yields and prices of agricultural products make agricultural income highly
volatile. Managing this volatility is particularly challenging for farmers in developing
countries where access to formal credit and insurance markets is limited. Therefore
many poor farm households need to rely on inefficient strategies to manage risk ex
ante and cope with shocks ex post (Fafchamps, 1992, Morduch, 1995, Townsend,
1995, Dercon, 2002, Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002).
An important strategy for managing risk ex ante is the careful selection of income
generating activities. Farm households typically face a tradeoff between the riskiness
of an activity and its expected return and may hence be forced to forego higher mean
returns in exchange for low risk. In addition, they need to consider that returns to
different income generating activities may be correlated. In order to keep overall risk
low, farm households therefore tend to engage in low-risk, low-return activities and
diversify their income generating activities, which prevents them from realizing gains
from specialization (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993, Dercon, 1996).
If shocks occur despite ex ante risk management, households use various ex post
coping strategies. Examples include receiving support from relatives and friends, sell-
ing financial and non-financial assets or increasing labor supply including child labor.
These strategies may be effective in case of idiosyncratic shocks like illness or job loss.
In the event of covariate shocks like drought which simultaneously affect the whole
environment, however, their effectiveness is limited. In addition, coping strategies like
selling productive assets and taking children out of school reduce the future income
generating capacity of a household and may increase its vulnerability to future shocks.
1This chapter is a slightly modified version of the working paper “Overconfidence and Risk Taking of
Ethiopian Farmers” jointly written with Toman Omar Mahmoud and Ulrich Schmidt.
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In sum, both ex ante risk management and ex post coping strategies pose a costly
task to farm households in developing countries. Traditionally, the volatility of agri-
cultural income has been attributed to external factors such as rainfall variability, the
eventual arrival of crop disease or pest infestation. Arguably, these factors are often
beyond farmer’s control. In this paper, we propose that part of the observed volatility
in agricultural income may not result from external factors but from overconfidence, a
psychological bias of the individual farmer.
Overconfidence is a robust phenomenon in the psychology of judgment which has
received increasing attention in the behavioral economics literature (see Odean, 1998,
Klayman et al., 1999, and Glaser et al., 2004, for a broad overview over the relevant
literature). The literature distinguishes between three types of overconfidence. The
first type of overconfidence is unrealistically positive self-evaluation. It describes the
tendency to overestimate one’s own positive attributes in absolute terms or relative to
others (Greenwald, 1980). The second type of overconfidence is unrealistic optimism
or illusion of control. It refers to a systematic overestimation of personal success
probabilities (Langer, 1975). The third type of overconfidence is miscalibration. It
denotes a systematic overestimation of the precision of one’s knowledge which implies
an underestimation of the variance of random variables (Lichtenstein et al., 1982).
Numerous studies provide evidence for the presence of all types of overconfidence
in a wide range of populations. A famous example is the study by Svenson, 1981,
who asked students to assess their own driving skills. 82% of the respondents judged
themselves to be in the top 30% of the group. Other examples include overestimated
management skills (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008), the overestimated ability
to interpret information, the overestimated precision of available information (Odean,
1998, 1999) and underestimated probabilities of future adverse events such as health
hazards (Weinstein, 1980). However, only few studies assess the degree of overcon-
fidence among farmers which are furthermore limited to developed countries, see e.g.
Eales et al., 1990, Pease et al., 1993, Buzby et al., 1994, Sherrick, 2002. These
studies suggest that the phenomenon of overconfidence is also common among farmers.
Several theoretical and empirical studies analyze the impact of overconfidence on
decision making. Most of these studies come from the behavioral finance literature
and focus on the role of overconfidence for investment decisions and financial market
outcomes. In this literature, overconfidence is usually modeled as miscalibration. If
subjects underestimate the volatility of financial assets, riskier portfolios become more
attractive (Odean, 1999). The impact of unrealistically positive self-evaluation and
unrealistic optimism on portfolio choice has not yet been studied theoretically although
some empirical studies suggest that these types of overconfidence may have a strong
impact on investment behavior (Biais et al., 2005, Glaser and Weber, 2007).
We add to this literature by showing with a simple theoretical model that unre-
alistically positive self-evaluation and unrealistic optimism lead, as miscalibration, to
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riskier portfolios. In addition, we empirically assess the presence of these types of over-
confidence and their behavioral implications in a new setting. Instead of analyzing the
impact of financial investors’ overconfidence on asset portfolios, we consider the impact
of overconfidence of poor small-holder farmers in a developing country on their crop
cultivation portfolios. This setting is particularly interesting for several reasons. The
crop cultivation decision represents an everyday decision of about 500 million small-
holder farmers. These farmers represent the overwhelming majority of people living in
rural areas of the developing world. Small-holder farmers have to directly bear the con-
sequences of their decision making. These may even affect the survival of the household
as small-holder farmers rely on current farm output to meet their subsistence needs.
This is in contrast to financial investors who are typically paid high fix salaries and
may solely lose their bonuses.
Our key hypothesis is that a farmer who overestimates his ability to generate crop
yields or underestimates the probability of future shocks is inclined to take excessively
high risk in crop cultivation activities. His biased behavior causes a partial failure
of ex ante risk management and thus higher than optimal volatility of crop returns.
The associated welfare loss results from an inefficiently frequent use of ex post coping
strategies, caused by the excessive income volatility.
We test the hypothesis that overconfidence increases risk taking by studying the
relationship between overconfidence and the riskiness of crop cultivation choices in a
sample of small-holder farmers in rural Ethiopia. We classify a farmer as overconfident
in the sense of unrealistically positive self-evaluation if he believes to be more productive
relative to other farmers in the same community than he actually is. Overconfidence
in the sense of unrealistic optimism is measured by an index that aggregates individual
subjective probabilities of future covariate agricultural shocks. As we only consider
covariate shocks, they should affect all community members with the same probability.
Thus, differences in stated probabilities reflect differences in individual optimism about
not being adversely affected in the future.
Individual risk taking is measured as the average standard deviation of returns per
hectare that is associated with the crop cultivation portfolio chosen by the individual
farmer, where a portfolio is characterized by the area that is allocated to different
crops. For each individual portfolio, we thus calculate by how much returns would
have fluctuated in the past assuming average regional yields and prices. The more
average returns would have fluctuated, the riskier the crop cultivation portfolio.
In line with our hypothesis, we find that overconfident farmers cultivate riskier
crops. Our finding implies that overconfidence increases the volatility of agricultural
income. Part of the observed volatility of agricultural income may therefore not be the
result of adverse covariate shocks such as fluctuations in rainfall, but of individual psy-
chological traits of farmers who overestimate their skills and abilities or underestimate
shock probabilities. Human deficiency may thus amplify the already substantial income
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volatility caused by unstable weather conditions. As a consequence farm households in
developing countries need to more frequently apply inefficient coping strategies which
reduces their welfare.
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5.2 Overconfidence and the risk-return tradeoff
Individuals frequently face a tradeoff between the mean return to an activity and its
riskiness. We argue that overconfidence in the form of unrealistically positive self-
evaluation and unrealistic optimism wrongly inflates the expected returns to a risky
activity. In expectation of high returns, overconfident individuals take inefficiently high
risk and end up with undesired levels of return volatility.
We study farmers in a developing country who determine their accepted level of
riskiness in crop cultivation by allocating their cultivable land to different crops. The
decision situation of a farmer can be described with the following simple theoretical
model. A farmer with land holdings of x hectare decides on the cultivation of two
different crops, crop s and crop r. Crop s is a low-risk, low-return crop. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that it is a safe crop that always generates
returns of ps per hectare. Crop r is a high-risk, high-return crop that is exposed to
covariate shocks comprising yield and price shocks occuring with probability pi. Returns
to crop r are hence state specific. If no shocks occur, its return amounts to pr > ps per
hectare. If a shock occurs, its return equals zero.
We first consider the case of a farmer who evaluates himself unrealistically positive.
We assume that unrealistically positive self-evaluation implies an overestimation of the
returns of cultivating the risky crop by an amount δ > 0 in both states. We assume that
overconfidence does not affect the expected returns from cultivating the safe crop. This
assumption seems plausible, as no sensible farmer should form erroneous expectations
regarding a certain outcome.
Let α denote the share of land holdings the farmer allocates to the risky crop. Then,
the subjectively estimated return of a crop portfolio equals (α(pr + δ) + (1 − α)ps)x
if no shock occurs and (αδ + (1− α)ps)x if a shock occurs. Obviously, it is profitable
to cultivate both crops only if pr + δ and ps are positive. Moreover, we assume that
the subjectively expected return of the risky crop exceeds the return of the safe crop
((1 − pi)(pr + δ) + piδ > ps) since otherwise no risk averse farmer would cultivate the
risky crop. We further assume that farmers exhibit constant relative risk aversion.2
When determining the optimal value of α, a farmer maximizes his expected utility
EU = (1− pi)((α(pr + δ) + (1− α)ps)x)β + pi((αδ + (1− α)ps)x)β
where β is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. For a risk averse farmer β < 13.
2Assuming constant relative risk aversion is standard practice in theoretical and empirical studies of
portfolio choice. Recently, the validity of the assumption of constant relative risk aversion has been
directly tested. Using longitudinal data Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008, and Chiappori and
Paiella, 2011 have shown that changes in the level of wealth do not significantly affect the portfolio
composition, which indicates that relative risk aversion is indeed constant.
3For convenience, we assume that β > 0 in the theoretical analysis such that the utility function is
given by u(x) = xβ . In general u(x) = lnx for β = 0 and u(x) = −xβ for β < 0. It is straightforward
to show that our results also hold for nonpositive values of β. We consider the case of risk averse
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Proposition 1
For a risk averse farmer the optimal share of land allocated to the risky crop α increases
with the overestimation δ of the returns to the risky crop.
Proof of proposition 1
The first-order condition for deriving the optimal value of α is given by
dEU
dα
= (1−pi)β((α(pr+δ)+(1−α)ps)x)β−1(pr+δ−ps)x+piβ((αδ+(1−α)ps)x)β−1(δ−ps)x = 0,
which yields
((1− pi)(pr + δ − ps))
1
β−1 (α(pr + δ) + (1− α)ps) = (pi(ps − δ))
1
β−1 (αδ + (1− α)ps).
Defining A = ((1− pi)(pr + δ− ps))
1
β−1 and B = (pi(ps− δ))
1
β−1 , the optimal value of α
is given by
α = (B − A)ps(B − A)ps + A(pr + δ)−Bδ
which yields
1
α
= 1 + A(pr + δ)−Bδ(B − A)ps .
Obviously, α is increasing in δ iff 1/α is decreasing in δ. We get
d 1
α
dδ
=
(dA
dδ
(pr + δ) + A− dBdδ δ −B)(B − A)ps − (dBdδ − dAdδ )ps(A(pr + δ)−Bδ)
(B − A)2p2s
and have to show that the numerator is negative. The numerator can be simplified to
−(B−A)2ps + pspr((dA/dδ)B− (dB/dδ)A) and is negative if (dB/dδ)A > (dA/dδ)B.
We get
dA
dδ
B = 1
β − 1((1− pi)(pr + δ − ps))
1
β−1−1(1− pi)(pi(ps − δ))
1
β−1 < 0
and
dB
dδ
A = 1
β − 1(pi(ps − δ))
1
β−1−1(−pi)((1− pi)(pr + δ − ps))
1
β−1 > 0
which completes the proof. Thus, a farmer who evaluates himself unrealistically pos-
farmers as many empirical studies have shown that decision makers are generally risk averse (see e.g.
Harrison et al., 2005 and Harrison et al., 2007).
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itive and overestimates the returns to the risky crop takes more risk in the optimal
allocation.4
Similarly, we can show within this simple framework that not only unrealistically
positive self-evaluation but also unrealistic optimism leads to increased risk taking.
We assume that an unrealistically optimistic farmer underestimates his personal risk of
return shocks by  such that the subjective probability of a shock amounts to pi− > 0.
Expected utility is then given by
EU = (1− pi + )((αpr + (1− α)ps)x)β + (pi − )((1− α)psx)β.
Proposition 2
For a risk averse farmer the optimal share of land allocated to the risky crop α increases
with the underestimation  of the shock probability.
Proof of proposition 2
The first order condition is now given by
dEU
α
= β(1−pi+)((αpr+(1−α)ps)x)β−1(pr−ps)x+β(pi−)((1−α)psx)β−1(−psx) = 0,
which yields
((1− pi + )(pr − ps))
1
β−1 (αpr + (1− α)ps) = ((pi − )ps)
1
β−1 (1− α)ps.
Defining C = ((1− pi + )(pr − ps))
1
β−1 and D = ((pi− )ps)
1
β−1 , the optimal value of α
is now given by
α = (D − C)ps(D − C)ps + Cpr
which yields
1
α
= 1 + Cpr(D − C)ps
and
d 1
α
d
=
dC
d
pspr(D − C)− (dDd − dCd )psprC
(D − C)2p2s
and again we have to show that the numerator is negative such that 1/α is decreasing
4So far we have assumed symmetric overestimation of returns of the risky crop in both states by the
amount δ. Alternatively, one could also assume asymmetric overestimation where the farmer would
overestimate returns only in the good state (no shock occurs) or only in the bad state (a shock
occurs). The theoretical prediction of increased risk taking as a result of overconfidence also holds
for these asymmetric cases. Proofs are available upon request.
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in . The numerator can be simplified to pspr((dC/d)D − (dD/d)C) and is negative
if (dC/d)D < (dD/d)C. We get
dD
d
C = 1
β − 1((pi − )ps)
1
β−1−1(−ps)((1− pi + )(pr − ps))
1
β−1 > 0
dC
d
D = 1
β − 1((1− pi + )(pr − ps))
1
β−1−1(pr − ps)((pi − )ps)
1
β−1 < 0
which completes the proof.
In sum, we have shown that overconfidence increases the share of land allocated to
the risky crop. Overconfidence thus leads to an inefficiently risky composition of the
crop cultivation portfolio. The inefficiency of the chosen portfolio clearly reduces the
welfare of the farmer. The farmer would have chosen a less risky portfolio had he been
aware of his overconfidence even though the riskier portfolio generates higher average
returns.
Based on the model predictions, we put forward the following hypotheses:
1. Unrealistically positive self-evaluation increases risk taking through the compo-
sition of the crop cultivation portfolio.
2. Unrealistic optimism increases risk taking through the composition of the crop
cultivation portfolio.
5.3 Setting and data 89
5.3 Setting and data
We test these hypotheses using data from small-holder farmers from rural Ethiopia.
This particular setting has several advantages. First, farmers in Ethiopia face a clear
risk-return tradeoff in crop cultivation. The most common crop is teff, a grass indige-
nous to Ethiopia. Teff furnishes injera, Ethiopia’s national dish which is eaten daily
in most households throughout the country. Other common crops are wheat, barley,
chickpeas and maize. These crops promise relatively low, but stable returns. Higher
returns are associated with the cultivation of onion, tomatoes, potatoes and other veg-
etables, which, however, fluctuate much more severely. As shown in Figure 5.1, means
and standard deviations of common crop returns vary widely and are highly correlated.
There is a clear tradeoff between returns to a crop and the risk involved.
Second, agricultural income in Ethiopia is highly volatile due to frequent covariate
shocks. Agriculture in Ethiopia is particularly vulnerable to rainfall shocks as virtually
all food crops come from rain-fed agriculture with irrigation covering only 2.5% of cul-
tivated land (FAO, 2005). Rainfall has historically been highly erratic and is projected
to become even more erratic as a result of climate change (IPCC, 2007, Schneider
et al., 2008). Due to the high dependence of agriculture on rainfall, rainfall fluctuations
directly translate into fluctuations of agricultural income.
Third, farm household consumption is sensitive to fluctuations of agricultural in-
come. As insurance against income losses is imperfect, farm households are not able to
smooth their consumption levels over time. Thus, fluctuations of agricultural income
reduce farm households’ welfare. Empirical evidence from Ethiopia suggests that farm
household consumption is particularly vulnerable to weather shocks. Having experi-
enced at least one drought in the previous five years lowers per capita consumption by
approximately 20% (Dercon et al., 2005). Rainfall shocks have long lasting and severe
effects on consumption growth (Dercon, 2004) . In the same vein, consumption per
adult equivalent is found to be significantly positively related with village level rainfall
(Dercon and Krishnan, 2000).
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Figure 5.1: Mean and standard deviation of returns to common crops (in Birr/ hectare;
16.67 Birr=1 USD) in Oromia region, 2003-2010; Own calculations based on data from the
Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (Agricultural Sample Survey and Producers’ Prices of
Agricultural Products Survey).
(a) All crops
(b) Enlargement of the marked area in the bottom left corner in Figure 1 (a)
5.3 Setting and data 91
The inability to protect household consumption from income fluctuations paired
with the frequent arrival of covariate shocks requires Ethiopian farm households to
carefully select crops regarding their drought resistance and tolerance to untimely rain-
fall. Given the risk-return tradeoff in crop cultivation, farm households may reduce
the individual risk of crop failure by composing a low risk portfolio which, however,
generates low average returns.
We base our analysis on a survey of Ethiopian small-holder farmers which we con-
ducted in the East and West Shewa Zones of the Region of Oromia in spring 2011.
The sample of farmers was randomly drawn from member lists of twelve agricultural
cooperatives in the survey area. In total, we sampled 366 farmers from 23 different
communities. The survey provides detailed information on crop cultivation decisions
as well as a wide range of household and individual attributes. It also contains a set
of questions that allow us to evaluate overconfidence in the sense of unrealistically
positive self-evaluation and unrealistic optimism.
We determine whether a farmer evaluates himself unrealistically positive by compar-
ing his self-assessed relative crop productivity with his actual relative crop productivity.
To measure the self-assessed relative crop productivity, we asked each farmer to assess
his average yields relative to the yields of other farmers from the same community on
a three-point scale as worse (1), about the same (2), or better (3).
To measure the actual relative crop productivity, we evaluate whether a farmer’s
main crop productivity (in kg per hectare) falls into the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd crop produc-
tivity tercile in his community. The main crop is defined as the crop that occupies
the largest cultivated area. The degree of unrealistically positive self-evaluation is then
given by the difference between the self-assessed relative productivity (worse 1, about
the same 2, or better than average 3) and the actual relative productivity (1st, 2nd, or
3rd productivity tercile). The resulting measure ranges from −2 to 2. A value of zero
implies that a farmer correctly assesses his relative crop productivity. Positive values
correspond to overconfident farmers who think their yields per hectare are relatively
higher than they actually are. Likewise, negative values correspond to underconfident
farmers who think their yields per hectare are relatively lower than they actually are.
A fictive example helps to illustrate our measure of unrealistically positive self-
evaluation. Consider a farmer who believes that his yields are on average higher than
the yields of other farmers in his community (i.e. his self-assessed relative productivity
takes a value of 3). He allocates the largest area of cultivated land to teff which makes
teff his main crop. Compared to the overall distribution of teff yields in his community,
however, his teff yields are relatively low and only fall into the first productivity tercile
(i.e. his actual relative productivity takes a value of 1). We would therefore quantify
his level of overconfidence in the sense of unrealistically positive self-evaluation with
3− 1 = 2.
Note that we base the measure of actual productivity on the main crop and not on
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the overall crop cultivation portfolio because the productivity of the overall portfolio
depends on the allocation of land to different crops. As shown in the theoretical model
above, the allocation of land to different crop is affected by overconfidence and hence
no longer exogenous. In contrast, the productivity of a single crop, including the main
crop, does not depend on the allocation of land and thus not on overconfidence.
We evaluate overconfidence in the sense of unrealistic optimism using an index of
a farmer’s optimism about not being hit by future covariate agricultural shocks. The
index is based on a question that asked a farmer to state whether it is very likely (1),
likely (2), unlikely (3), or very unlikely (4) that his household will be affected by each
of the following three common shocks in the next twelve months: i) Large fall in sale
prices of crops, ii) large rise in agricultural input prices and iii) very poor harvest due to
drought/ shortage of rain. The index sums the stated levels of likeliness over the three
shocks and is normalized to the [0, 1] interval. Higher values of the index correspond to
more optimistic individuals. The index considers only covariate shocks as these would
simultaneously affect all farmers in a given community. Hence, the true probability of
the occurrence of these shocks should be identical for all farmers in the community.
The selected shocks are very common in the study area. 75% of the households in the
sample have experienced a large fall in sale prices of crops in the past five years, 90%
a large rise in agricultural input prices and 86% a very poor harvest due to drought/
shortage of rain.
To capture the degree of risk taking in the crop cultivation decision, we measure the
riskiness of the chosen crop cultivation portfolio. A widely accepted measure of portfolio
riskiness is the variance or volality of portfolio returns. Hence, an ideal measure of the
riskiness of a given portfolio would be the volatility of a farmer’s returns to this portfolio
over time.
Returns to a given portfolio in year i are defined as
Portfolio returni =
n∑
j=1
areaj yieldij priceij
with areaj, the area in hectare allocated to cropj in the survey year 2011, yieldij,
the yield of crop j in year i in kg per hectare, and priceij, the price per kg for crop j
in year i in constant 2011 Birr (16.67 Birr=1 USD).
However, this measure is hard if not impossible to observe. Even if longitudinal
data of crop portfolio returns were available for individual farmers, one would still not
be able to measure the volatility of returns to a specific portfolio. This is because
farmers typically change the composition of their portfolio and do not exhibit constant
productivity over time (e.g. because of idiosyncratic productivity shocks such as serious
illness).
We therefore use historical data on average yields and prices of different crops in
the study region to evaluate the riskiness of a crop cultivation portfolio that a farmer
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chose in 2011. The underlying logic is that a larger volatility of average returns to a
portfolio should correspond to a larger volatility of individual returns. In particular, we
first calculate the average returns to a given portfolio for different years using average
yearly yields and prices for the period 2003-2010 that are specific to the Region of
Oromia. We then calculate the standard deviation of portfolio returns over time and
divide it by the area of the cultivated land. To ease interpretation, we finally normalize
this measure such that it has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The
resulting measure of risk taking captures the per hectare volatility of average returns
to a given portfolio.
Information on average yields comes from the Ethiopian Agricultural Sample Sur-
vey. It is an annual survey conducted by Ethiopia’s Central Statistical Agency to
estimate crop cultivation areas and the volume of crop production in the main crop
season. The survey covers a sample of more than 40 000 private farm households and is
representative at the region level. Information on average prices comes from the Pro-
ducers’ Prices of Agricultural Products Survey, which is also conducted by Ethiopia’s
Central Statistical Agency. It provides monthly average producers’ prices of agricul-
tural products at the region level. Both yield and price data are available for the period
2003-2010. We can therefore compute the average returns to a given portfolio for this
period which directly preceeds the survey year.
A theoretically important determinant of risk taking is a farmer’s risk attitude. We
therefore conducted a monetarily incentivized choice game to study risk behavior under
high monetary incentives. Our experimental elicitation of risk attitudes followed the
standard procedure of Holt and Laury, 2002, with ten choices, each between a safe
alternative A and a risky alternative B. In the first choice, the risky alternative B is
very unattractive as the probability of winning the high amount (25 Birr ≈ 1.50 USD)
is very low (0.1). The probability of winning the high amount increases from choice to
choice by 0.1 until it amounts to one in the last choice, so that B dominates A in the
last choice. The point at which a farmer switches from choosing the safe lottery A to
choosing the risky lottery B allows inferring his coefficient of relative risk aversion. A
higher number of safe choices corresponds to a higher degree of risk aversion (see Holt
and Laury, 2002, for details). After a farmer had made all ten choices, he rolled a
ten-sided die to randomly select one choice that was played out for real. The average
payout was 17 Birr (≈ 1 USD), almost equivalent to the daily wage of an unskilled
farm worker at the time of the survey.
Being aware of the unfamiliarity of most farmers with the concept of probabilities,
we paid particular attention to a simple and clear explanation of the choice game. In
particular, we provided farmers with a visual presentation of the game using strings
that contained ten beads with the color of a bead determining the payoff (see Figure D.1
in the appendix). A consistent response rate with only one switch from the safe to the
risky option of 89% of the sample makes us confident that the majority of respondents
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fully understood the rules of the game. Table 5.1 provides the distribution of the elicited
risk attitudes in our sample. Most farmers switched after at least five safe choices. They
are hence relatively risk averse (β < 1), as assumed in our theoretical model above.
Nevertheless, the average degree of risk aversion is relatively low in comparison to the
initial study by Holt and Laury, 2002, and other studies in developing countries (e.g.
Henrich and McElreath, 2002, Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004, Hardeweg
et al., 2011, Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009, Harrison et al., 2009).
Table 5.1: Elicitation of risk attitudes and distribution of elicited risk attitudes
A B Number of Range of coefficient of
Choice pi(x1) x1 x2 x1 x2 safe choices n % relative risk aversion
1 0.1 13 11 25 1 0-1 25 7.67 β < 2.05
2 0.2 13 11 25 1 2 26 7.98 2.05 < β < 1.55
3 0.3 13 11 25 1 3 35 10.74 1.55 < β < 1.18
4 0.4 13 11 25 1 4 42 12.88 1.18 < β < 0.86
5 0.5 13 11 25 1 5 81 24.85 0.86 < β < 0.57
6 0.6 13 11 25 1 6 60 18.4 0.57 < β < 0.28
7 0.7 13 11 25 1 7 36 11.04 0.28 < β < -0.05
8 0.8 13 11 25 1 8 19 5.83 -0.05 < β < -0.5
9 0.9 13 11 25 1 9-10 2 0.61 -0.5 < β
10 1 13 11 25 1 326 100
Note: 16.67 Birr=1 USD.
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5.4 Empirical analysis
Farmers are fairly inaccurate in estimating their relative crop productivity. In total,
the sample is characterized by overconfidence. 46% of the farmers believe that their
productivity is higher relative to other farmers in their community than it actually
is. They thus view themselves unrealistically positive. 34% correctly estimate their
productivity tercile. The remaining 20% underestimate their relative productivity.
Farmers differ considerably in their optimism about not being hit by future co-
variate agricultural shocks. The overall coefficient of variation of our optimism index
is 0.39. However, it makes more sense to investigate the dispersion in the degree of
optimism within communities, i.e. within a given covariate risk environment in which
the objective probabilities of covariate shocks are identical. Even within communities
the coefficient of variation of the index has an average value of 0.38, which points to
the existence of unrealistic optimism among at least part of the farmers.
Using ordinary least squares, we regress risk taking as measured by the normalized
standard deviation of portfolio returns per hectare on overconfidence:
Risk takingk = α + β overconfidencek +X ′k γ + k
where overconfidencek is the degree of overconfidence of farmer k captured either
by our measure of unrealistically positive self-evaluation or our measure of unrealistic
optimism. Xk a vector of control variables and k an error term. If overconfidence
increases risk taking, we expect β to be positive.
Table 5.2 summarizes the results for unrealistically positive self-evaluation. Column
1 starts with a specification that controls for important dimensions of heterogeneity
between farmers. The set of control variables comprises a farmer’s age and his ability
to write5 and various proxies for household wealth including the size of a household’s
own land holdings and the ownership of a radio and mobile phone. We also include
detailed measures of a household’s demographic composition to proxy for on-farm labor
supply. In addition, fixed effects at the cooperative level eliminate any type of local
heterogeneity and ensure that we only compare farmers within the same local setting
and risk environment. Unrealistically positive self-evaluation is strongly and positively
associated with risk taking. The coefficient suggests that an increase in the overesti-
mation of the actual main crop productivity tercile by one tercile corresponds to an
increase in the volatility of portfolio returns per hectare by 0.09 standard deviations.
Hence, holding everything else constant, changing a farmer’s confidence bias from very
underconfident (−2) to very overconfident (2) would increase the volatility of portfolio
returns per hectare by 0.34 standard deviations.
We check the robustness of this result by gradually expanding the set of control
5We control for the ability to write instead of educational attainment as hardly any farmer in the
sample has completed formal schooling.
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variables. We first consider the possibility that our measures of overconfidence and risk
taking may not reflect a farmer’s actual traits and behavior, thus biasing the estimated
relationship. Our measure of unrealistically positive self-evaluation may wrongly clas-
sify a farmer as overconfident if he had recently experienced an adverse idiosyncratic
shock such as a serious illness. In that case, the observed relative productivity of a
farmer in the current period may not be representative of his (unobserved) average
relative productivity. As a farmer’s self-assessed relative productivity refers to his av-
erage relative productivity, we would then overestimate his degree of overconfidence.
For a given level of risk taking, this would lead to a downward bias in the coefficient
of interest. We therefore add a dummy to the set of control variables that takes the
value of one if a farmer experienced a severe idiosyncratic shock in the twelve months
prior to the survey. We consider different types of shocks including serious illness or
injury of a household member, death of a household member, fire, loss of land due to
the reallocation of land as well as idiosyncratic agricultural shocks such as crop disease
and pest. About 14% of the sampled farmers reported at least one of these shocks.
Likewise, our measure of risk taking may not be representative of the risk taking
of an individual farmer. By using average returns to evaluate the riskiness of a crop
cultivation portfolio, we may overestimate the degree of individual risk taking if a
farmer takes appropriate measures to reduce his exposure to risks. In that case, the
actual volatility of a farmer’s portfolio may be lower than the assigned average volatility.
For a given level of overconfidence, this would lead to an upward bias in the coefficient
of interest. We therefore add a set of control variables that indicate the use of risk-
reducing measures. In particular, we control for the share of cultivated land on which
a farmer uses crop disease prevention, fertilizer and improved seeds.6
Column 2 shows that our previous result on the relationship between unrealistically
positive self-evaluation and risk taking is robust to the inclusion of these additional
control variables. Compared to Column 1, the coefficient of unrealistically positive
self-evaluation is somewhat lower, but remains highly significant and positive.
In a last step, we also control for a farmer’s risk attitude. Column 3 uses the exper-
imentally elicited degree of risk aversion, Column 4 a self-assessment of risk aversion.
The latter is based on a survey question that asked a farmer whether he would describe
himself as somebody who generally tries to avoid risks or somebody who is willing to
take risks. Both risk measures turn out to be insignificant and their inclusion does not
affect the coefficient of interest.
Table 5.3 summarizes the results for unrealistic optimism. It follows the same struc-
ture as Table 5.2. As for the case of unrealistically positive self-evaluation, unrealistic
optimism is strongly and positively associated with risk taking. The coefficient in Col-
umn 1 suggests that, holding everything else constant, changing a farmers perception
6In theory, a farmer may also use irrigation to reduce rainfall-related volatility in crop yields. In
practice, however, irrigation is a very uncommon practice in the study area.
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of the likelihood of not being hit by future covariate agricultural shocks from extremely
pessimistic to extremely optimistic corresponds to an increase in the volatility of port-
folio returns per hectare by 0.72 standard deviations.
Overall, we find clear support for our hypothesis that overconfidence in the sense
of both unrealistically positive self-evaluation and unrealistic optimism increases risk
taking.
5.4 Empirical analysis 98
Table 5.2: The relationship between risk taking in crop cultivation and overconfidence in
terms of unrealistically positive self-evaluation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Unrealistically positive self-evaluation 0.086*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.070***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ability to write -0.036 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050)
Size of own land holdings -0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Radio ownership -0.044 -0.053 -0.042 -0.053
(0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.056)
Mobile phone ownership 0.045 0.013 0.058 0.014
(0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048)
Nr hh members 0-9 years 0.001 0.001 -0.009 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Nr hh members 10-18 years 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Nr female hh members 19-54 years -0.037 -0.011 -0.020 -0.010
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Nr male hh members 19-54 years -0.056** -0.055** -0.052* -0.055**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Nr hh members 55 years or older -0.047 -0.028 -0.041 -0.028
(0.053) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052)
Recent idiosyncratic shock 0.078 0.065 0.078
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Crop disease prevention 0.383*** 0.357*** 0.384***
(0.095) (0.098) (0.096)
Improved seed usage -0.002 0.015 -0.002
(0.086) (0.094) (0.086)
Fertilizer usage 0.296** 0.322** 0.297**
(0.135) (0.138) (0.135)
Risk aversion (experimentally elicited) -0.001
(0.013)
Risk aversion (self-assessed) 0.010
(0.047)
Constant -0.679*** -1.352*** -1.410*** -1.354***
(0.177) (0.222) (0.235) (0.223)
Locality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 341 341 303 341
R-squared 0.463 0.501 0.524 0.501
Results of OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the normalized standard deviation of
average returns to the currently selected crop cultivation portfolio. ***/**/* denote
significance at a 1/5/10 per cent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5.3: The relationship between risk taking in crop cultivation and overconfidence in
terms of unrealistic optimism
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Unrealistic optimism 0.721* 0.650** 0.513* 0.673**
(0.387) (0.323) (0.293) (0.332)
Age -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ability to write 0.054 0.084 0.038 0.094
(0.121) (0.118) (0.117) (0.121)
Size of own land holdings -0.024 -0.037 -0.029 -0.037
(0.047) (0.049) (0.053) (0.049)
Radio ownership 0.030 0.006 0.063 0.004
(0.092) (0.093) (0.117) (0.093)
Mobile phone ownership 0.069 0.021 0.060 0.008
(0.142) (0.135) (0.151) (0.135)
Nr hh members 0-9 years 0.005 0.015 0.005 0.016
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Nr hh members 10-18 years 0.008 -0.001 0.010 -0.003
(0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038)
Nr female hh members 19-54 years -0.034 0.033 0.011 0.025
(0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041)
Nr male hh members 19-54 years -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.008
(0.071) (0.070) (0.074) (0.070)
Nr hh members 55 years or older 0.049 0.067 0.085 0.065
(0.080) (0.077) (0.090) (0.077)
Recent idiosyncratic shock 0.034 0.044 0.036
(0.070) (0.075) (0.071)
Crop disease prevention 0.524*** 0.564*** 0.513***
(0.150) (0.172) (0.147)
Improved seed usage 0.401 0.523 0.397
(0.261) (0.320) (0.259)
Fertilizer usage 0.846*** 0.840*** 0.840***
(0.313) (0.318) (0.311)
Risk aversion (experimentally elicited) -0.057
(0.042)
Risk aversion (self-assessed) -0.119
(0.091)
Constant -0.910* -2.402*** -2.126*** -2.394***
(0.490) (0.754) (0.654) (0.750)
Locality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 366 366 326 366
R-squared 0.182 0.247 0.272 0.250
Results of OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the normalized standard deviation of
average returns to the currently selected crop cultivation portfolio. ***/**/* denote
significance at a 1/5/10 per cent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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5.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between overconfidence and risk taking in an income
generating process. In particular, we consider the impact of unrealistically positive self-
evaluation and unrealistic optimism on risk taking of farmers who can allocate their
cultivable land to different crops and thereby face a risk-return tradeoff.
In a first step, we theoretically show that overconfidence in the sense of both un-
realistically positive self-evaluations and unrealistic optimism increases the share of
cultivable land allocated to risky crops. The excessive riskiness of the chosen crop
cultivation portfolio implies a higher than optimal volatility of returns, which in turn
implies a welfare loss for the decision maker.
In a second step, we empirically test the theoretical prediction that overconfidence
increases risk taking. Using a sample of small-holder farmers from rural Ethiopia, we
find that farmers who overestimate their relative crop productivity or underestimate
the probability of future shocks cultivate riskier crops.
Our findings suggest that observed fluctuations in agricultural income may not only
be the result of adverse covariate shocks, but of psychological biases of individual farm-
ers that distort their decision making. If consumption cannot be smoothed efficiently
over time, as is typically the case in developing countries, overconfidence leads to a
reduction of farm household’s welfare.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation has explored human decision making in the following situations -
whether or not to privately insure against the financial risk associated with longevity,
which lottery to chose in an experimental choice siutation, how much effort to spend
in preparing for a future exam and how much risk to take in earning income. A special
focus has been put on the interface between economic and psychological approaches in
explaining human decision making.
Chapter 2 has empirically investigated determinants of private pension insurance
uptake of German households. Relevant factors suggested by theory and previous
empirical work have been simultaneously assessed in a multivariate framework. House-
holds have been found to take advantage of private information on expected lifetime
in the pension insurance choice. Conditional on other relevant variables, households
expecting to become old, are significantly more likely to take up supplementary pri-
vate pension insurance. This can be interpreted as a sign of adverse selection in the
German market for private pension insurance leading to rising insurance premia and
low demand. However, the effect is quantitatively small which casts doubt on adverse
selection as a satisfactory explanation of the low take up of private pension insurance.
Additional explanations brought forward by the behavioral economics literature like
the complexity of the product paired with limited financial literacy of the decision
maker or aversion to losses from the annuity as a result of early death may shed more
light on the annuity puzzle.
Chapter 3 has experimentally tested whether preferences are consistent with the
independence axiom imposed in expected utility theory and the criteria of transparent
and non-transparent stochastic dominance. In contrast to most related studies, the
analysis has used a sample from a developing country. Violation rates of expected util-
ity theory in the common ratio problem and rates of selecting stochastically dominated
lotteries in this sample turned out to be comparable to those observed in samples from
developed countries. Thus, poor subjects from developing countries seem to behave
similarly to subjects from the western world in experimental risky choice situations.
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Chapter 3 has furthermore analyzed which characteristics of the decision maker deter-
mine his consistency with these rationality criteria. The econometric results suggest
that sociodemographic characteristics of the subjects only partly explain experimental
choices. More educated subjects tend to violate expected utility theory more frequently,
whereas we do not observe any relationship with violating the principle of stochastic
dominance. No robust pattern regarding the influence of age, income or wealth of the
respondent was identified. However, the analysis suggests that psychological traits of
the decision maker like his trustfulness or optimism play an important role.
Chapter 4 has evaluated the costs of overconfidence during preparation for a future
task. It has been theoretically shown that an overconfident individual invests less than
optimal time in effort spending after having monitored his current preparation status.
At the same time, overconfidence inflates performance expectations. As a consequence,
performance and subjective well-being of the overconfident individual deteriorate. The
theoretical predictions have been confirmed in an empirical application to a student
learning process. The data clearly support a performance and happiness reducing
effect of an overly optimistic assessment of one’s existing knowledge prior to the final
knowledge retrieval.
The finding of adverse effects of overconfidence is replicated in a completely dif-
ferent set-up in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Chapter 5 has focused on the relationship
between overconfidence and risk taking behavior in an income generation process. In
particular, the impact of overconfidence on risk taking through crop choice by farm-
ers in a developing country has been considered. The phenomenon of overconfidence
is demonstrated in a sample of poor small-holder farmers in Ethiopia. Farmers who
evaluate their ability to generate crop yields unrealistically positive cultivate riskier
crops. The excessive risk taking implies more pronounced fluctuations of returns. Part
of the observed income volatility in developing agroeconomies thus seems to be caused
by a biased assessment of the own abilities of decision makers. Again, overconfidence
clearly causes a welfare loss to the decision maker and his dependents. They need to
deploy costly ex post coping mechanisms to smooth consumption more frequently than
if they made their production decision in an unbiased way.
Taken together, the findings support the hypothesis of overconfidence as a univer-
sal phenomenon. Moreover, the results suggest a substantial behavioral relevance of
overconfidence in different decision making situations. Leaving possible motivational
effects of overconfidence aside, it can be concluded that decision makers tend to be
negatively affected by their biased decision making. Thus, measures such as regular
performance feedback that allow people to see themselves in an unbiased mirror may
help them to accomplish more efficient decision making and higher levels of well-being.
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Derived Variable Original Variables
PPI f72m_4_imp
AVSLE f06s_imp; f10s_imp; f90o1_imp; f90o2_imp; f91o1_imp;
f91o2_imp; f91s_imp; f92o1_imp; f92o2_imp; f92s_imp
RISKAVERSE f59a4_imp; f59a5_imp; f59a6_imp
IMPATIENT f59c1_imp; f59c2_imp; f59c3_imp
FINLIT f73eo6_imp; f73eo11_imp
CIVSERV f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
WORKER f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
SELFEMPL f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
FINWEALTH(EQ) f73eo1_imp; f73eo2_imp; f73eo3_imp; f73eo5_imp; f73eo6_imp;
f73eo11_imp; f78o3_imp; f78o4_imp; f78o5_imp; (f10s_imp)
OTHWEALTH(EQ) f82o_imp; f68o_imp; f70o_imp; f84o_imp;
f78o1_imp; f78o2_imp; (f10s_imp)
OTHINS(EQ) f73eo9_imp; f73eo10_imp ; (f10s_imp)
AGE f07o_imp; f10s_imp; f11o_imp; year
NRCHILD f13o_imp
MARRIED f09s_imp
PARTNER f10s_imp
INCOME(EQ) f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp; (f14o_imp; f18o_imp)
EAST bula
Source: The German SAVE study 2005.
Table A.1: Derived variables and their underlying original variables
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Variable Fraction of imputed observations
f06s_ind 0.00
f07o_ind 0.02
f09s_ind 0.00
f10s_ind 0.00
f11o_ind 0.00
f13o_ind 0.01
f14o_ind 0.00
f18o_ind 0.01
f24s1_ind 0.03
f24s2_ind 0.02
f54o1_ind 0.15
f54o2_ind 0.13
f59a4_ind 0.04
f59a5_ind 0.04
f59a6_ind 0.04
f59c1_ind 0.01
f59c2_ind 0.02
f59c3_ind 0.03
f68o_ind 0.03
f70o_ind 0.03
f72m_4_ind 0.00
f73eo1_ind 0.14
f73eo2_ind 0.12
f73eo3_ind 0.15
f73eo5_ind 0.04
f73eo6_ind 0.09
f73eo9_ind 0.13
f73eo10_ind 0.08
f73eo11_ind 0.03
f78o1_ind 0.02
f78o2_ind 0.04
f78o3_ind 0.04
f78o4_ind 0.04
f78o5_ind 0.03
f82o_ind 0.02
f84o_ind 0.02
f90o1_ind 0.02
f90o2_ind 0.03
f91o1_ind 0.03
f91o2_ind 0.03
f91s_ind 0.02
f92o1_ind 0.03
f92o2_ind 0.03
f92s_ind 0.02
N 1320
Note: N is sample size (non-retired housholds).
Source: The German SAVE study 2005. Own calculations.
Table A.2: Fraction of imputed observations per underlying variable in estimation sample
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table B.1: Summary statistics for the regression sample
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Violation of EU (Allais) 365 0.403 0.491
Violation of transparent SD 366 0.071 0.257
Violation of non-transparent SD 365 0.553 0.498
No formal education 366 0.448 0.498
Some or completed primary education 366 0.459 0.499
More than primary education 366 0.093 0.291
Ability to write 366 0.596 0.491
Ability to calculate 366 0.874 0.332
Age 34- 366 0.126 0.332
Age 35-44 366 0.254 0.436
Age 45-54 366 0.251 0.434
Age 55-64 366 0.227 0.419
Age 65+ 366 0.142 0.350
Trust 366 1.984 0.927
Optimism 366 0.429 0.166
Risk aversion 326 4.715 1.919
Household size 366 7.197 2.414
Size of own land holdings 366 3.432 2.369
Radio ownership 366 0.765 0.425
Mattress ownership 366 0.828 0.378
HH income 1st tercile 366 0.333 0.472
HH income 2nd tercile 366 0.333 0.472
HH income 3rd tercile 366 0.331 0.471
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Model extension to more than one task
Let us consider a decision-maker who maximizes utility by allocating her time
budget on effort spending for two different tasks, A and B, and leisure.
Utility in t = t˜ is given by
Ut˜ = Ut˜(Et˜[pAT ], Et˜[pBT ], l2) (C.1)
with ∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[p
j
T ]
> 0, ∂
2Ut˜
∂(Et˜[p
j
T ])2
< 0 for j = [A,B], ∂Ut˜
∂l2
> 0, ∂
2Ut˜
∂(l2)2 < 0.
For simplicity, we assume that the decision-maker is only biased with regard to the
current knowledge relevant for task A, but unbiased with regard to task B. As before,
the expected performance on task A is defined as the sum of the subjective current
knowledge and the expected knowledge gain:
Et˜[pAT ] = KAst˜ (eA1 , a) + ∆KAst˜ (KAst˜ , eA2 , a) (C.2)
= (1 + γ)KAt˜ (eA1 , a) + ∆KAst˜ ((1 + γ)KAt˜ , eA2 , a) (C.3)
where γ ≥ −1 and ∂∆KAst˜
∂eA2
> 0, ∂
2∆KAs
t˜
∂(eA2 )2
< 0 and ∂
2∆KAs
t˜
∂eA2 ∂K
A
t˜
< 0.
In case of task B, expected performance is defined as
Et˜[pBT ] = KBt˜ (eB1 , a) + ∆KB st˜ (KBt˜ , eB2 , a) (C.4)
where ∂∆K
B s
t˜
∂eB2
> 0, ∂
2∆KB s
t˜
∂(eB2 )2
< 0 and ∂
2∆KB s
t˜
∂eB2 ∂K
B
t˜
< 0.
The sum of time spent on effort for tasks A and B and leisure needs to equal the total
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time endowment:
eA2 + eB2 + l2 = 1. (C.5)
Maximizing (C.1) with respect to eA2 , eB2 and l2 subject to (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5) yields
the first-order conditions
∂L
∂eA2
= ∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pAT ]
∂Et˜[pAT ]
∂eA2
+ λ = 0 (C.6)
∂L
∂eB2
= ∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pBT ]
∂Et˜[pBT ]
∂eB2
+ λ = 0 (C.7)
∂L
∂l2
= ∂Ut˜
∂l2
+ λ = 0 (C.8)
which lead to the optimality conditions
∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pAT ]
∂Et˜[pAT ]
∂eA2
= ∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pBT ]
∂Et˜[pBT ]
∂eB2
(C.9)
∂Ut˜
∂Et˜[pAT ]
∂Et˜[pAT ]
∂eA2
= ∂Ut˜
∂l2
. (C.10)
According to (C.9), the expected marginal utilities of effort in the two tasks A and B
are equalized. According to (C.10), the expected marginal utility of effort in task A
equals the marginal utility of leisure in the optimum.
Analogous to the single task model, the expected marginal productivity of effort
in task A is positive, but decreases with the bias γ. Thus, an increase in the bias γ
reduces the expected marginal productivity of effort in task A, which corresponds to
a decrease of the left-hand sides of (C.9) and (C.10). It therefore leads to less effort
spent on task A, but more effort spent on task B and more leisure consumed in the
optimal allocation.
This extended framework implies that underconfidence does not only come at the
cost of inefficiently low consumption of leisure, but also inefficiently low effort spending
on other tasks. Thus, underconfidence will be detrimental for overall achievement.
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Tables
Table C.1: Variable description
Overconfidence Estimated multiple choice test score/multiple choice test score - 1
MC score Score in multiple choice test from 0 to 10
Estimated MC score Estimated score in multiple choice test from 0 to 10
Percentage exam score Score in exam/120 × 100
Estimated perc. exam score Estimated score in exam/120 × 100
Grade Exam grade from 0 (failed) to 10 (excellent)
Estimated grade Estimated exam grade from 0 (failed) to 10 (excellent)
Satisfactory grade Satisfactory exam grade from 0 (failed) to 10 (excellent)
High school grade Average grade in high school from 0 (failed) to 10 (excellent)
Male Dummy = 1 for male subjects
Economics student Dummy = 1 for students majoring in economics
Happiness Subjective well-being from 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy)
Monetary incentives Dummy = 1 for monetary incentives treatment
Table C.2: Summary statistics for the regression sample
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Overconfidence bias 108 0.21 0.57
MC score 108 5.95 1.91
Estimated MC score 108 6.39 1.37
Percentage exam score 108 60.84 14.40
Estimated percentage exam score 108 72.31 9.12
Grade 108 4.73 2.67
Estimated grade 107 5.61 1.68
Satisfactory grade 108 5.41 1.93
High school grade 108 5.96 1.73
Male 108 0.60 0.49
Economics student 108 0.36 0.48
Happiness 90 6.03 2.74
Monetary incentives 108 0.45 0.50
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Table C.3: Impact of monetary incentives on the confidence bias
Dependent variable
|Bias| Bias
Monetary incentives -0.04 0.05
(0.10) (0.11)
High school grade -0.03* -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Economics student 0.15 0.29**
(0.12) (0.13)
Male 0.02 -0.07
(0.09) (0.10)
Constant 0.47*** 0.3
(0.15) (0.18)
R squared 0.05 0.07
N 108 108
Results of OLS estimation. ***/**/* de-
note significance at a 1/5/10 per cent
level. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. As allocation to tutorial groups at the
beginning of the semester was not random,
a vector of control variables is included.
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Figure D.1: Visual representation of the risk attitude elicitation game
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Table D.1: Variable description
Riskiness of the crop cultivation portfolio Normalized standard deviation of average returns to portfo-
lio per hectare
Unrealistic positive self-evaluation Self-assessed main crop productivity tercile–actual produc-
tivity tercile (the main crop is the crop that occupies the
largest area)
Unrealistic optimism Sum of perceived unlikeliness of three future covariate agri-
cultural shocks on scale from 1 (very likely) to 4 (very un-
likely) normalized to [0, 1]
Age Age of household head
Ability to write Dummy=1 if household head is able to write
Size of own land holdings Size of land owned by household in hectare
Radio ownership Dummy=1 if household owns a radio
Mobile phone ownership Dummy=1 if household owns a mobile phone
Nr hh members 0-9 years Number of children aged 0 to 9 years in household
Nr hh members 10-18 years Number of youths aged 10 to 18 years in household
Nr female hh members 19-54 years Number of female adults aged 19 to 54 years in household
Nr male hh members 19-54 years Number of male adults aged 19 to 54 years in household
Nr hh members 55 years or older Number of elderly aged 55 years or older in household
Recent idiosyncratic shock Dummy=1 if household has experienced a severe idiosyn-
cratic shock in the 12 months prior to the survey
Crop disease prevention Share of cultivated land where households used disease pre-
vention
Improved seed usage Share of cultivated land where households used improved
seeds
Fertilizer usage Share of cultivated land where households used fertilizer
Risk aversion (experimentally elicited) Degree of risk aversion as experimentally measured by the
round in which household head switched to the risky option
Risk aversion (self-assessed) Dummy=1 if household head describes himself as somebody
who generally tries to avoid risks
Table D.2: Summary statistics for the regression sample
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Riskiness of the crop cultivation portfolio 366 2448.436 667.592
Unrealistic positive self-evaluation 341 0.352 1.020
Unrealistic optimism 366 0.429 0.166
Age 366 49.675 12.489
Ability to write 366 0.596 0.491
Size of own land holdings 366 3.432 2.369
Radio ownership 366 0.765 0.425
Mobile phone ownership 366 0.555 0.498
Nr hh members 0-9 years 366 1.710 1.323
Nr hh members 10-18 years 366 2.298 1.451
Nr female hh members 19-54 years 366 1.276 0.753
Nr male hh members 19-54 years 366 1.383 0.922
Nr hh members 55 years or older 366 0.527 0.665
Recent idiosyncratic shock 366 0.137 0.344
Crop disease prevention 366 0.717 0.294
Improved seed usage 366 0.233 0.317
Fertilizer usage 366 0.781 0.220
Risk aversion (experimentally elicited) 326 4.715 1.919
Risk aversion (self-assessed) 366 0.260 0.439
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